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The purpose of this study is to investigate whether empirical evidence support traditional 
determinants and theories of capital structure in the listed South African property 
industry, a relatively new adopter of the globally recognised and regulated Real Estate 
Investment Trust (REIT) structure. There currently exists little academic literature 
focusing on this specific topic in the South African property sector. Furthermore, the 
recent change of the prevalent legal form of South African listed property companies, 
affords a unique opportunity to investigate the possible impact of regulatory changes on 
capital structure within this context.  
 
A panel regression is applied to a sample of 39 firms over the period 2005 to 2019, which 
includes all property companies with South African exposure listed on the JSE, both 
during the pre-REIT and REIT regimes. This results in an unbalanced panel of 314 
company years. The regime change to the REIT structure appears to have, on average, 
increased the use of leverage in South Africa’s listed property sector. Debt usage, 
however, remains well below the allowed regulatory limit and lower than worldwide 
counterparts.  
 
The regression results offer support for the trade-off theory, pecking order theory and 
market timing theory in the South African listed property context, and are generally in 
agreement with international findings. Thus, size is found to be positively correlated to 
debt levels, in line with trade-off theory prediction. Growth opportunities tend to 
increase leverage ratios, which is consistent with the pecking order theory. Evidence for 
market timing behavior is the positive correlation found between 12-month share price 
movements and leverage. Other firm specific determinants including share volatility and 
interest cover ratio also offered pecking order theory support. Inflation was also found 
to have a significant effect on leverage in the sector. In conclusion, it is found that the 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and rationale 
Capital structure is a long debated and researched topic in finance, with many different 
and sometimes opposing theories being developed to explain observed, and propose 
optimal, capital structures. More than fifty years have passed since Modigliani and 
Miller’s1 landmark paper on the impact of capital structure on firm value, and there is still 
no real consensus on the driving forces of capital structure. Myers (1984) refers to the 
“Capital Structure Puzzle”. He later states that there is no universal theory for capital 
structure, and nor does he see any reason to expect one (Myers, 2001).   
 
Capital structure theories attempt to explain the choice of financing within a firm, where 
the choices can be internal in the form of retained earnings, or external through a mix of 
either debt of equity. A firm needs to finance business activities and investment with one 
or a combination of these sources. How it does this and the driving factors behind this 
decision are central to the capital structure discussion – which is still ongoing. Traditional 
capital structure theories have been well cemented in the modern day finance 
curriculum, and supported (and disputed) by countless empirical studies on listed firms, 
which cover many countries, industries and time periods. 
 
However, one important subsector of the listed equity market that has received less 
attention from academic researchers in this regard are listed property funds, or Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)2 which, because of various unique characteristics, may 
behave quite differently to listed non-property firms when it comes to factors affecting 
their capital structure. REITs are considered regulated firms, as aspects of their 
operations, such as the amount of debt they can take on and their flexibility with regards 
to the retention of profits, are constrained by law. This REIT-specific regulation makes 
for interesting comparison to traditional firms, and how REIT’s capital structure 
behaviour and drivers compare in a finance and investment setting.   
 
 
1 Modigliani and Miller (1958), widely considered the forefathers of corporate finance and capital structure theory, 
introduced the original publication “The cost of capital, corporate finance, and the theory of investment” in 1958. This 
is thought to have been a catalyst for much of the theoretical and empirical studies that followed.   
 
2 A REIT is described in more detail later but is essentially a category of listed property. Furthermore the terms real 
estate and property (which is typically the term used for real estate in South Africa) are used interchangeably 
throughout this study. 
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Graham and Leary (2011) conclude that a “one size fits all” approach to capital structure 
across multiple industries does not sufficiently explain firms’ capital structures. 
Furthermore, Mackay and Phillips (2005) find that most variation in capital structure is 
firm specific, rather than industry specific. Feng et al (2007) specifically note that much 
of the capital structure literature excludes REITs due to their unique regulatory operating 
environment, and Howe and Schilling (1988) state that little empirical work exists on 
regulated firms and, in particular, non-tax paying entities (which include REITs). 
 
Harrison et al (2010) suggest that, given the size of the global REIT market3 , closer 
investigation into REIT capital structure decisions are warranted. Riddiough and Steiner 
(2015) go so far as to put forward a customised theory of REIT capital structure and 
Breuer et al (2018) further investigate what they refer to as a “REIT Debt Puzzle”. With 
this in mind and with the South African REIT market at least six years old and of 
significant size4, it is clearly worth investigating the capital structure relationships of SA 
REITs and their non-REIT precursors, and further to determine whether the changes in 
the South African regulatory environment for listed property affect the results.    
 
This study investigates capital structure determinants in the South African listed 
property industry both before and after its conversion to REIT status, and whether the 
empirical evidence for this sector supports any of the traditional capital structure 
theories. As previously mentioned, whilst there is plenty of academic literature regarding 
the capital structures of firms, only a small proportion of these relate to REITs. An even 
lesser proportion relates REITs in developing markets such as South Africa, which is a 
rare case of a listed property industry converting from other formats to REIT status. This 
potentially makes South Africa a unique subject for study with regards to listed property 
and capital structure, a study which to the author’s knowledge has not been conducted 
before.5 
 
3 Latest estimates from NAREIT place the total market capitalisation of only US REITs at $1.3 trillion  
  
4  South Africa officially introduced REIT regulations 1 April 2013. Latest figures from the South African REIT 
Association place the total market capitalisation of South African REITs at circa R 280 billion down from its historic 
peak in of circa R 400 billion in early 2017. 
   
5 Le and Ooi (2012), Rovolis et al (2014) and Dogan et al (2019) include South Africa in their analysis of global listed 




1.2 Listed property and REITs as an asset class 
Listed property is a portfolio of properties organised into one investable instrument so 
that investors are able to participate in the income and growth return of that specific 
property portfolio. Investors are able to access to the associated cash flows that would 
otherwise be inaccessible to them, as they are unable to buy these properties themselves 
in their individual capacities. The vast majority of worldwide listed property vehicles are 
classified as REITs. A REIT is a tax conduit company dedicated to the owning, managing 
and operating income-producing real estate (Mazurczak, 2011). This short definition 
highlights two important aspects of REITs, being i) they are focused on real estate and 
real estate related activities and ii) they have a flow-through tax status.  
 
A REIT is a globally identifiable, liquid and tradable investment instrument with which 
an investor can gain exposure to the underlying asset class of real estate. By virtue of their 
tradability on a public stock exchange these funds, which were originally largely created 
as an investment vehicle for institutions that tended to avoid investing in real estate 
because of lack of transparency and liquidity, provide liquidity for an asset class generally 
considered illiquid (Feng et al, 2007).  
 
Real estate, whether in REIT form or not, is essentially an alternative asset class which 
can be considered a hybrid security exhibiting elements of both bonds and equities 
(Maritz & Miller, 2004). The steady, predictable and sustainable cash flows emanating 
from the underlying portfolio of properties give it bond like features, whilst the supply 
and demand forces and capital growth potential of the underlying property give it equity 
like features (Bradford & Munro, 2010). The motivations for real estate investment or its 
addition to a general portfolio include (i) to establish a portfolio that reasonably 
represents an overall investment universe (Hudson-Wilson et al, 2003); (ii) to reduce 
overall portfolio risk through uncorrelated, inflation hedging, cash flows from real estate 
exposure which results in portfolio diversification benefits6; and iii) enhancement of 
portfolio returns7. REIT specific motivating factors include i) liquidity and tradability on 
 
6 Taderera and Akinsomi (2020) find that South African industrial and retail property provide a good inflation hedge 
in the long term. Erasmus (2015) found evidence of inflation protection when analysing the South African listed 
property sector. Marzuki (2019) finds evidence of diversification benefits when including South African listed property 
into a mixed asset portfolio allocation. Carstens (2018) also found evidence of diversification benefits when adding 
South African REITs to a portfolio of US REITs. 
 
7 Edelstein et al (2010) find support for enhanced returns when adding South African listed property to a mixed asset 




a recognised stock exchange; ii) transparency by virtue of having specific regulation; iii) 
regular dividends through mandatory net rental distributions; iv) and advantageous tax 
treatments 8. 
1.3 A brief history of REIT markets 
The US were the first adopters of REIT structures in 1960, and are considered the 
leaders in REIT thinking, having tested and refined the structures long before other 
countries considered implementing REITs (Rampersad, 2010). Globally the US are also 
the dominant players with a market size of $ 1,144 billion (ZAR 17,160 billion) and 
approximately 200 separately listed REITs trading in the market. This far exceeds any 
other global REIT market. The first European country to officially adopt the REIT 
structures was the Netherlands in 1969. Despite the age of their REIT sector they 
consist of only 5 REITs, with a market size of $ 23 billion (ZAR 355 billion). Australia’s 
REIT market has been functioning since 1971, consists of 50 REITs and is $ 95 billion 
(ZAR 1,431 billion) is size. Many other major economic markets including, amongst 
others, the UK, Japan, France, Singapore and Canada, gradually started adopting official 
REIT status through the 1990’s and early 2000’s.  
 
South Africa’s official REIT status came online relatively late in 2013. Promisingly 
though, with a market size of circa $ 22 billion (ZAR 340 billion) consisting of 31 REITs, 
it is the largest REIT market by value among developing countries,9 and is also larger 
than some of the developed markets. Appendix 1 shows selected global REIT markets, 
their relative sizes, number of REITs listed and year of commencement relative to South 
Africa. Appendix 2 shows a selection of developing REIT markets relative to South 
Africa. 
1.4 REIT characteristics  
Given that REITs represent a specific and rather unique asset class, it is important that 
there is uniformity and clarity around the treatment and governance of REITs. Each 
 
8 The tax conduit nature of REIT allows all profits to be distributed free of tax to investors. Tax savings or advantages 
have not been argued in this study. See Atkinson, A. 2017, Listed property: An attractive option for your tax-free 
investment portfolio, viewed 21 September 2018. 
 
9 These figures are according to the EPRA Global REIT Survey 2019. Interestingly of the BRICS countries Russia and 
China do not yet have official REIT structures. India’s REIT structures are fledging with little to no officially recognised 
REITs. One imagines given the size of these markets that once their REIT structures have been recognised and properly 
taken off these REIT markets would outsize that of SA. Brazil’s REIT environment is older, has more listed REITs, but 
is smaller in size to that of SA. Other noteworthy developing market REITs include Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand and 




global REIT market has its own specific REIT legislation and structure outlining its 
respective requirements, but these are mostly conceptually similar10. In general, REIT 
legislation typically include income and asset tests, requiring that either a proportion of 
income must be derived from property, or a percentage of assets must actually constitute 
property. This requirement ensures REITs do not deviate from their property focus.   
 
There are also typically minimum distribution ratios for dividends, which are associated 
with the tax flow-through nature of REITs. As a general rule, provided all taxable earnings 
(or at least the minimum prescribed amount) are distributed as dividends, a REIT will 
not pay normal company tax. In essence, a REIT acts as a conduit and tax is then payable 
by the recipient of those earnings, that being the net income from the portfolio of 
properties. In South Africa, the dividends received from REITs are included as part of a 
taxpayer’s taxable income, and would attract tax at that person or entity’s marginal tax 
rate11. Similarly, a REIT is not subject to capital gains tax on any disposal of properties or 
property related assets. The conduit principle would again apply, where the ultimate 
owner of the REIT security is liable for the capital gains tax on disposal of the security.  
 
Furthermore, dividends tax is not applied to any amounts distributed by a REIT. REITs 
are therefore required to pay out the minimum prescribed taxable earnings in order to 
maintain REIT status, and in order to be fully tax optimal REITs should pay out as close 
to 100% of taxable earnings as possible12. This is generally the case in practice. The 
minimum distribution ratios prescribed by law vary from 75% to 100% amongst the 
larger REIT markets. The minimum distribution in South Africa is 75%.  
 
REITs also have restrictions on the amount of debt or leverage they are able to use. Some 
jurisdictions have a conservative approach whilst others are much more lenient. 
Leverage limits among the leading REIT markets range from 45% in Singapore, to 
 
10 Appendix 3 summarises REIT requirements of relevance to the study for selected REIT markets – namely the larger 
developed markets. The European Public REIT Association (EPRA) Annual Global REIT Survey 2019 provide good 
summaries of legislation, requirements and restrictions for the all global REIT markets. 
 
11 Here a person could be a natural person or juristic person. Income tax rate for SA companies is 28%. Tax structuring 
beyond the first and official owner of a SA REIT has not been considered. 
  
12 For clarity, REITs need to distribute according to their prescribed minimum – in South Africa 75% - to maintain their 
REIT status, and thus importantly their tax neutrality. A REIT distributing 100% of earnings would in theory have zero 
tax liability, and one distributing between 75% and 100% would have a – albeit negligible – tax liability. It would be a 
reasonably safe assumption that REITs would operate around the 100% mark, as investors regard the distributions 




unlimited (implying greater than 100% leverage13) in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, 
Spain and the US.  South Africa’s leverage restriction, at 60%, lies to the more 
conservative end of the scale14. Appendix 3 contains a comprehensive comparison of 
regulatory restrictions for the main REIT markets globally. 
1.5 Listed property and REITs in South Africa 
While the SA listed property sector has been operating for a couple of decades, the era of 
standardised and regulated South African Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) is still 
in its early years. Following years of debate and negotiation the SA REIT legislation was 
formalised and officially enacted in April 2013. One of the main rationales for the changes 
was to bring the SA listed property sector in line with well-established and international 
best practices regarding the treatment and classification of REITs, and in so doing, 
promote foreign investment15. Previously popular structures in the SA property sector – 
namely Property Loan Stocks (PLSs) and Property Unit Trusts (PUTs)16 – were complex, 
confusing and not recognised by the international investment community. In this regard 
SA property sector lacked the uniformity and transparency of the REIT branding that its 
international counterparts had, and in the case of some international markets had 
enjoyed for several years.  
 
The introduction of this new legislation in SA was soon followed by the conversion – over 
time – of the existing SA listed property companies to REIT status. The introduced REIT 
structure has since 2013 gone on to replace the previously used PLS and PUTs structures, 
with new entrants into the SA property market post 2013 opting to use the REIT 
structure. Approximately 10 new REITs have listed on the JSE after 2013. Since 2006, 
which is about when the initial discussions around conversion to REITs commenced 
(Boshoff & Bredell, 2013), the JSE REIT sector market capitalisation has increased 
fourfold. Since the REIT legislation of 2013, this market capitalisation doubled17.  
 
13  Whilst the legislation allows for unlimited leverage in certain REIT jurisdictions, other legislation, such as thin 
capitalisation rules and interest deductibility limits, may curb the amount of leverage used. 
 
14 In South Africa, the leverage limit of 60% is based on a leverage ratio defined as total debt to gross assets. In other 
REIT jurisdictions that have a fixed leverage limit, the definition of leverage may differ slightly. This study will focus on 
interest bearing debt to total assets as the primary leverage measure. 
 
15 Carstens (2018) found that foreign investors have had a significant impact of share liquidity of REITs post the 
introduction of REIT status in South Africa.   
 
16 A summary and comparison of Property Loan Stocks, Property Unit Trusts and REITs is provided in Appendix 4. 
17 This is with reference to its last peak in 2017. 2018 and 2019 were unfortunately rather ignominious years for the 
South African REIT market. Appendix 5 demonstrates the growth in the South African listed property market in both 
pre-REIT and post-REIT periods. 
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1.6 Preview, research objectives and approach 
Over the sample period South Africa’s use of leverage in listed property, and subsequently 
REITs, are in this study found to be on the lower end of the scale when compared to other 
developed market REITs. Of the countries with no leverage limits Japan, Canada and the 
US appear to be more liberal in the use of debt, with leverage ratios of between 42% and 
52% (see Appendix 6). On average South African REITs seem to operate well below the 
regulatory leverage limit of 60%. Of the countries with leverage limits, South Africa 
appears to have the lowest leverage ratio, and adjusted for the regulatory limit is the most 
conservative. At first glance it would appear that South Africa errs on the side of 
conservatism with regards to usage of debt in capital structure.  
 
The research questions for this study can be summarised as follows: 
1. Are there marked differences between pre- and post-REIT implementation leverage 
levels in South Africa? 
2. Which determinants of capital structure are correlated with the leverage ratios of South 
African listed property companies, and is the evidence consistent with any capital 
structure theories?   
3. Can the determinants and theories alone explain the leverage levels and funding 
decisions of listed property in South Africa, or are there other factors involved? 
 
In an attempt to shed more light on these research questions, South African listed 
property data from 39 firms listed on the JSE has been collected for the sample period 
2005 - 2019, then used in a panel regression model. The variable of interest or dependent 
variable, leverage, is regressed against various control variables generally used in capital 
structure research and may hopefully provide further explanation in respect of the 
research objectives.  
1.7 Novelty and contribution 
The unique characteristics of REITs as outlined above, include (i) tax exempt status, (ii) 
mandatory dividend distribution, and (iii) limitations on leverage levels 18 . All these 
elements have noteworthy differences from traditional firms, and can therefore 
potentially have an effect on capital structure decisions. Various studies, mainly focused 
 
18 It is noted that there are other distinguishing features. For example, Riddiough and Steiner (2015) highlight the 
diversified ownership rule in US REITs and its effect on capital structure. South Africa has no ownership rules 




of US REITs19 or well-established REIT markets in developed countries20, have sought to 
explain which capital structure determinants have a significant impact on the financing 
mix within REITs, as well as which traditional capital structure theories (or non-
traditional theories) are prevalent. This study seeks to explain same for the South African 
listed property market.  The introduction of REITs and switch over from the previously 
used Property Loan Stock and Property Unit Trust structures in 2013 makes for an 
interesting investigation of how regulatory changes affect listed property debt levels, and 
whether drivers of capital structures changed between the two regimes.  
 
The author’s intention is to contribute to the existing literature of capital structure of 
REITs and provide further insight on funding decisions and leverage levels chosen by 
South African REITs in particular.  The novelty of the research emanates from (i) the 
industry analysed, REITs, which are a unique asset class generally neglected in the 
literature, (ii) the country analysed, South Africa, which is a developing country with 
relatively young and under-researched REIT system; (iii) that includes both the period 
before and after a regulatory switch to a REIT-based industry structure. The findings may 
be of interest to investors, managers and professionals operating in the REIT and REIT 
lending space. 
1.8 Thesis map 
The remainder of the document is set out as follows. Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature 
on general capital structure and further discusses theories and determinants of capital 
structure, generally and with specific reference to REITs and listed property, in 
developed and developing markets. Chapter 3 describes the data and methodology used. 
The results and analysis are set out in the Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 summarises the 








19 Alcock and Steiner (2017), Harrison et al (2010) and Sant (2018) look at capital structure determinants in US REITs. 
 
20 Chikolwa (2011) and Zarebski and Dimovski (2012) consider Australian REITs, Jakobsen and Olsson (2015) perform 
a study on European REITs, Bond and Scott (2006) consider UK listed property firms. Cashman et al (2016) focus on 
Asian real estate markets. Erol and Tirtiroglu (2011) review Turkish REITs. Rovolis et al (2014) consider REITs and 
listed property in developed and developing markets including South Africa, as do Dogan et al (2019).. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES 
Capital structure and the use of leverage within firms has been a well-documented topic 
in finance since the original pioneering paper of Modigliani and Miller in 1958. They 
introduced the Irrelevance Theorem which suggested that, under certain assumptions, a 
firm’s overall value is unaffected by the combination of debt and equity it chooses. So the 
leverage within a firm - no matter the quantum or detail - is under the theory, irrelevant. 
Whilst the theory holds under perfect market assumptions it, ironically, ignores rather 
‘relevant’ and real modern day considerations including taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency 
costs and transactions costs – to name a few. Notwithstanding its suggested lack of 
applicability, the Irrelevance Theorem was influential in igniting more discussion and 
research around capital structure, with many looking to either prove or disprove it. 
Incremental research since then has led to adapted versions of the Irrelevance Theory, 
and new theories altogether, of which the origin is in most cases Modigliani and Miller’s 
opening theory. 
2.1 Capital structure theories 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) would later update their capital structure theory to cater 
for taxes. They introduced the concept of a tax shield benefit that is derived from the use 
of debt. That is, a firm is able to reduce their tax liability with the use of debt as the 
interest from debt is a tax deductible expense. They argued as the debt increases within 
the capital structure of a firm, the market value of the firm increased by the present value 
of the tax shield benefit from debt. By implication, a firm would be motivated to maximise 
debt within the capital structure in order to maximise the tax shield benefit, and thus 
increase the value of the firm. However, as pointed out by Solomon (1963), at extreme 
levels of debt the cost of capital must rise as capital markets will demand higher rates of 
return for extreme levels of debt. Baxter (1967) also suggested that higher levels of debt 
would lead to a probability of default of interest payments to creditors and thus 
bankruptcy – what he dubbed “risk of ruin”. Firms would seek a capital structure that 
maximises the tax shield benefit yet minimises bankruptcy costs. Stiglitz (1972) looked 
at the effects of bankruptcy on the value of a firm and concluded that interest rates on 
debt increase where there is a likelihood of bankruptcy and thus market value of a firm 
is dependent on the likelihood of bankruptcy. These were the early signals that there was 




2.1.1 Trade-off theory 
Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) later suggested that capital structure is a trade-off 
between two of these perfect assumptions under the Modigliani and Miller (1963) theory 
– taxes and bankruptcy. Their study incorporated the tax shield benefit and bankruptcy 
into a state preference model. On the one end of the trade-off theory firms will derive a 
tax shield benefit from the use of debt within their capital structure. The tax shield benefit 
increases with the usage of debt. Firms with higher marginal tax rates will benefit more, 
and such firms may be inclined to increase their leverage (Miglo, 2010). Mackie-Mason 
(1990) found that firms with higher marginal tax rates were more likely to have higher 
debt ratios within their capital structures. Fama and French (1998) however find no 
evidence that the tax shield benefit from debt affects the market value of firms. Barclay 
et al (2013) find that taxable real estate firms use more debt than their non-taxable 
counterparts in a US sample spanning 1984 to 2010. This finding, although not large in 
magnitude, lends credence to a tax shield effect or lack thereof in non-taxable real estate 
firms. 
 
Under the trade-off theory this debt tax shield benefit is counterbalanced by the risk of 
bankruptcy stemming from the usage of debt. The use of leverage requires regular 
payments to be made to creditors. Failure to or potential failure to pay creditors can 
result in financial distress in the form of actual bankruptcy or the threat of bankruptcy. 
Costs of bankruptcy can be direct or indirect. Baxter (1967) outlines direct costs to be 
administrative costs, legal expenses and penalties incurred whereas indirect costs relate 
to the reduction in market value and increased cost of capital, both debt and equity.  The 
greater the usage of debt the greater the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy. By 
deduction, a less risky firm is able to leverage more than a relatively riskier comparative 
firm (Myers, 1984). That is, they are able to leverage more before the costs of financial 
distress start to negate the debt tax shield benefit. 
 
Essentially the balance of debt and equity in a firm is determined by the balance between 
the debt tax shield benefit and the increased risk of bankruptcy. Under the theory firms 
will trade-off between the debt tax shield benefit and bankruptcy costs to find their 
optimal capital structure or put differently have a target capital structure. Graham and 
Harvey (2001) found that a fair proportion of CFO’s surveyed adopted a target capital 
structure. What this also implies is that firms will target an optimal capital structure once 
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found and would return to it if there is a deviation, that is, leverage ratios are mean or 
‘target’ reverting. Leary and Roberts (2005) find evidence of firms rebalancing leverage 
within an optimal range for firms observed between 1980 and 1999. Kayhan and Titman 
(2007) find support for mean reversion in debt ratios in a large sample of firms between 
1960 and 2003.21  Versmissen and Zietz (2017) investigate US REITs between 1993 and 
2013, and find support for active target debt behavior. 
 
The above concept of optimal or target capital structure is considered within a static 
trade-off theory in a single period framework. A dynamic trade-off theory looks at 
optimal capital structure over multiple periods. The correct capital structure decision is 
dependent on what is anticipated and required in the next period – and even subsequent 
periods. Firms will tend to forecast and then implement investment activities such as 
acquisitions, disposals and capital expenditure and any associated financing activities. 
Importantly, the cost of capital in future periods can be different to the current period. 
Firms may wish to raise finance (or repay finance) as either debt or equity, depending on 
the cost of each. What this essentially means is that the optimal capital structure is 
different over time.22  
 
Under the trade-off theory firms with tangible assets are thought to be less susceptible to 
financial distress and are therefore expected to have more debt in their capital structure. 
Conversely, firms with either less tangible assets or significant intangible assets are 
expected to have less debt in their capital structure. The presumption here is that tangible 
assets are less risky than intangible assets. As Myers (1984) points out, specialised 
intangible assets or growth opportunities are more likely to lose value in times of 
financial distress when compared to tangible assets. Rajan and Zingales (1995) find that 
this relationship exists in the capital structures of companies in the G7 countries. REIT 
firms would be an example of firms with a very high percentage of tangible assets.  
 
The trade-off theory also predicts that firms with fewer non-debt tax shield 
opportunities, such as depreciation, are more motivated to take on debt to take advantage 
of the debt tax shield (DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980). On the other hand, firms with 
 
21 Both these studies exclude regulated firms like listed property and REITs. 
 
22 The mean reversion or adjustment rate to target debt ratios have not been included in the statistical analysis or 
hypothesis testing in this study. See Fama and French (2002), Ertugral and Giambona (2011), and Vermissen and Zietz 
(2017) for more information on this. 
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significant non-debt tax shields may be less inclined to adjust their capital structure 
towards debt solely for gaining the debt tax shield advantage. Titman and Wessels (1988) 
do not find any significant support for non-debt tax shields having an effect on debt ratios 
when analysing US firms from 1974 to 1982. Interestingly, with REIT firms one would 
expect, given their high percentage of tangible assets, a significant non debt tax shield – 
ignoring the fact that REITs are tax exempt. However, the real estate held in a REIT is 
considered an investment and is not depreciated, but rather revalued annually.23 
 
Due to their tax status REITs have neither debt nor non-debt tax shield benefits, yet the 
other end of the trade-off balancing act – bankruptcy – is still very relevant. This situation 
is not isolated to REITs; there are other regulated firms with tax exemptions, who lack 
incentive to borrow given no apparent tax advantage (Myers, 1984). What is isolated to 
REITs in certain jurisdictions - South Africa for example - is the regulatory limit on 
leverage. The imposition of a leverage limit has some interesting implications.  Firstly, it 
could be argued that where the imposed limit is lower than perceived maximum level 
where financial distress would become an issue, there could be an inherent loss of 
optimal leverage. Secondly, by having a fixed upper limit on leverage, firms operating at, 
or very close to, that limit would have little to no debt capacity available. At these limit 
levels firms would have no choice but to use non-debt funding resources. It should be 
noted that the lack of debt capacity issue would also apply where a firm was operating at, 
or close to, the financial distress limit as envisaged under the trade-off theory.   
 
This makes the application of the trade-off theory trickier in the case of regulated and tax 
exempt firms such as REITs. The inherent lack of tax incentive leaves a one legged trade-
off theory, suggesting lower debt levels in REITs relative to firms in other tax paying 
industries. Although a logical argument, there is empirical evidence showing contra signs.  
Harrison et al (2010), Feng et al (2007) and Barclay et al (2013) all report fairly high 
average leverage ratios in their real estate samples. Breuer et al (2018) compare a US 
REITs to non-REIT sample between 1999 and 2015, and find the median REIT leverage 
ratio to be far larger than that of the non-REIT sample.  
 
 
23 To the author’s knowledge this is the case in South African REITs. Real estate may in certain circumstances have 
equipment such as security monitoring equipment, or other depreciable assets such as solar panels. These are generally 
not material in value and can be ignored for the purposes of this study.   
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2.1.2 Agency cost theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) refer to the agency problems between different parties in a 
firm, and how these might affect the makeup of capital structure. One of these conflicts is 
between managers and shareholders. Harris and Raviv (1991) point out that to the extent 
managers do not own 100% of equity in a firm, they do not receive the entire gain from 
their management activities, which creates a lack of incentive. This leads to moral hazard 
behaviour, as managers may tend to pursue activities that maximise personal gain over 
maximising firm value.  Jensen (1986) reveals the free cash flow problem, whereby over-
investment issues can occur due to managers taking on too many projects (of high risk) 
with the sole view of self-gain, whilst such investment can be suboptimal for the firm and 
create unnecessary financial risk. Managerial incentives can, depending on structure, 
either mitigate or enhance these agency problems. 
 
The other conflict involves shareholders and debtholders. Shareholders have limited 
liability in the event of failed projects, which again may lead to moral hazard behaviour 
from shareholders who will pursue riskier projects knowing their risk is limited. 
Shareholders will shift risk to debtholders by replacing quality projects for inferior 
projects, referred to as the asset substitution problem (Jensen, 1986). On the other hand, 
shareholders of poorly performing firms that are close to bankruptcy will have little 
incentive to invest in new value-increasing projects, as the majority of the returns of this 
project will flow to debtholders, whilst shareholders bear the full cost (Myers, 1977). This 
is considered a debt overhang issue, where the amount of existing leverage would also 
discourage debtholders from new investments just as much as shareholders. This agency 
issue instigated by too much leverage leads to underinvestment in new profitable 
projects.  
 
However, as put forward by Jensen (1986), the use of debt can be useful in mitigating 
some of these agency issues. The frequent and mandatory interest payments on debt can 
limit the availability of free cash, so that managers are forced to manage prudently as 
opposed to recklessly spending resources on self-gain.  This ‘disciplining effect’ is useful 
to shareholders. Stulz (1990), does however, point out that excessively high debt levels 
result in high interest payments that reduce free cash flow beyond reasonable levels, thus 




When considering agency issues in REITs one can immediately conclude that the free 
cash flow problem is significantly mitigated by the mandatory dividend distributions. 
Managers have little to no internal resources to play with, and are forced to use either 
debt, equity or a combination for new investments. In REIT regimes that impose leverage 
limits, the asset substitution effect would be curbed by virtue of the maximum debt 
allowed and similarly debt overhang issues would in theory be less, due to an inability to 
reach excessively high debt levels. REIT regimes with very high or unlimited leverage 
limits would still face these problems. Howton et al (2003) report that the agency cost 
hypothesis is not consistent with their findings when analyzing debt and equity issues of 
US REITs between 1993 and 2001. Brown and Riddiough (2003) argue an agency cost 
effect in US REITs due to the nature of secured and unsecured debt and their relative 
covenants. The increased scrutiny from outside debt holders as well as inherent covenant 
restrictions curb the amount of debt used.24 
 
2.1.3 Pecking order theory 
Myers and Maljuf (1984) introduced the pecking order theory, which states that firms 
follow an order of preference with regards to capital structure. A firm will finance itself 
firstly using internal profits, then source debt, and lastly issue equity as a last resort 
(Myers, 1984). The theory revolves around the concept of asymmetric information 
(information disparities) between insiders and stakeholders25. Equity is considered to 
have the highest information asymmetry cost, followed by debt, and then retained 
earnings as having no such cost. The Myers and Maljuf (1984) model posits that managers 
will not issue undervalued equity if acting in the interest of shareholders, which leads 
shareholders to assume that equity issued is thus overvalued. This, in turn, could lead to 
a downward adjustment of equity in the market. Managers wish to avoid issuing equity 
to prevent this costly situation. The pecking order follows the order of least information 
asymmetry costs. Thus, managers choose what is at the time the lowest cost financing 
option, or the path of least resistance (Barclay & Smith, 2005). Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
find support for pecking order predictions for firms in G7 countries.  
 
Within a REIT scenario, it would appear the traditional pecking order cannot hold due to 
the mandatory payouts of profits. REIT firms only really have the option of debt and/or 
 
24 See also Riddiough and Steiner (2018) 
 
25 The terms information costs or adverse selection are also commonly used here. 
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equity financing. Furthermore, the debt element can potentially be capped to a limit 
depending on the REIT regime. Ott et al (2005) find that US REITs between 1981 and 
1999 placed little reliance on retained earnings for financing of investments, but rather 
used equity and long term debt. Feng et al (2007) looked at US REITs that had IPO’s 
between 1991 and 2003, and concluded that REITs prefer to issue debt whenever the 
cost of discounted equity exceeds the costs of financial distress.  
 
2.1.4 Market timing theory 
The market timing theory of capital structure claims that firms will attempt to align the 
issuance of debt or equity with the most optimal and favourable time in the prevailing 
market. This market timing can manifest itself in two versions. One version, as proposed 
by Myers and Maljuf (1984), is that managers and investors are rational, and it is assumed 
that the issuance of equity is preceded by the release of positive firm information to the 
public, which is said to reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. The reduction in information asymmetry will increase the share price. 
Firms can thus create their own market timing. This is referred to as the dynamic 
asymmetric information version of market timing. 
 
The other version, as put forward by Baker and Wurgler (2002), is that market 
participants are irrational, which results in stock mispricings over time. Managers of 
firms will issue equity when they believe the cost of issue is abnormally low (shares are 
overpriced) and repurchase equity when the cost of issue is abnormally high (shares are 
underpriced). Managers believe they can time the market, and this drives their capital 
structure decisions. Managers will consider the debt and equity market conditions and 
issue what they consider the most favourable at the time – whether or not funding is 
required. The implications are that changes in prevailing market values will affect capital 
structure decisions. 
 
In a survey of US firms, Graham and Harvey (2001) found that some managers do indeed 
attempt to time the market and interestingly also found they tried to issue debt at periods 
of low prevailing interest rates, a sort of debt based market timing. Brounen et al (2006) 
similarly find an association between stock price increases and new stock issuances in 
their European survey study. Boudry et al (2010) report strong evidence of market 
timing theory for a US REIT sample for the period 1997 to 2006. Ooi et al (2010) also 




2.1.5 Financial flexibility 
Financial flexibility has been found to be one of managers’ top priorities in capital 
structure decision making. Both Graham and Harvey (2001) and Brounen et al (2006) 
find evidence of this in the survey of managers in the US and Europe respectively.26 In the 
evolution of capital structure theories, financial flexibility is a fairly new and under-
researched theory relative to the traditional theories, but has gained more coverage over 
recent years. A broad definition for financial flexibility is a firm’s ability to easily access 
finance, either internal or external, at reasonably low cost and within acceptable time to 
(i) avoid any financial distress situations that may arise and (ii) capitalise on profitable 
investment opportunities. Thus, financial flexibility contains elements of risk 
management and investment growth management.   
 
In the literature, financial flexibility has been measured using different proxies, usually 
leverage policy, spare debt capacity, excess cash holdings, share repurchases, and debt 
retirements. Ma et al (2015) considered spare debt capacity in American and Chinese 
firms and concluded that financial flexibility has a positive impact on performance. Arslan 
et al (2014) considered South East Asian firms pre- and post the 1998 Asian crisis. They 
suggest that leverage-based and cash-based flexibility measures are better predictors 
than traditional measures. Their analysis showed that firms with greater financial 
flexibility pre-crisis had greater ability to take on investment opportunities and 
performed better during the crisis. Harris (2015) shows in a large US sample that 
financial flexibility in the form of share repurchase activity is positively related to firms’ 
debt levels. 
 
Marchica et al (2014) document that conservative leverage policies focused on financial 
flexibility can enhance investment ability. Their tests suggest that financially flexible 
firms invest more and invest better. They argue that financial flexibility in the form of 
untapped borrowing reserves is a crucial component of capital structure theory. Wong 
(2017) considers the unused debt capacity of Malaysian and Singaporean REITs between 
2003 and 2015. They conclude that debt conservatism behaviour is at play with lower 
than optimal debt ratios, as well as conservative use of debt buffers relative to the 
 
26 Bancel and Mittoo (2004) also found that managers in sixteen European countries valued financial flexibility when 




regulatory REIT limits applied in those countries. They contend these results cannot be 
explained by traditional capital structure theories like trade-off theory and pecking order 
theory. 
2.2 Measures of leverage 
The definition and measurement of leverage varies throughout the existing literature. 
There is no universally accepted unit of measurement, and the different measurements 
may provide mixed results when analysing capital structure decisions (Harris & Raviv, 
1991). Book leverage is based on book values as stated in financial statements, whereas 
market leverage is based on the market value of equity, or market capitalisation. 
According to Adrian et al (2016) managers actively manage book leverage, while market 
leverage is driven mainly by market forces. Fama and French (2002) similarly believe 
that managers make capital structure decisions based on available book value data, 
because market value data can be highly volatile and depend on factors outside of the 
firm’s control. The literature seems divided on which measure is more relevant, and 
which measure is better when reviewing different capital structure theories, with some 
studies using both measures in their assessments - sometimes with differing results.27 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) consider various different refinements of the leverage proxy, 
and suggest that the selection of leverage measure would depend on the objective of the 
research. They distinguish between total liability and total debt, where total liability 
consists of total debt, plus other liabilities and accruals, accounts payable and 
miscellaneous creditors. Total debt is a measure of actual debt issued or borrowings 
sourced – at a cost – where there is an obligation of repayment of both interest and 
capital. Total debt can be further broken down into short term debt and long term debt.28 
Earnings to interest expense ratio is also considered as a proxy of leverage. 
 
In studies specific to REITs and listed property, total debt is generally used as either a 
book leverage measure, or a market leverage measure. Chikolwa (2011), Jakobsen and 
Olsson (2015), and Breuer et al (2018), focus on the book leverage measure. Alcock et al 
 
27 See Pandey (2001), Wang (2017) and Dogan et al (2019) for examples where differing proxies can produce either 
very similar, or very different, results.  
 
28 An important consideration is the role of debt maturity in capital structure (see Giambona et al (2008), Alcock et al 




(2010), Harrison et al (2010), Alcock and Steiner (2017), and Sant (2018) opt for market 
leverage measures in their studies.29 
2.3 Determinants of capital structure and empirical evidence 
Capital structure determinants found in the literature are generally classified into three 
categories, namely:  
 Firm specific characteristics  
 Industry specific characteristics  
 Country specific characteristics  
 
What follows is a discussion of the more common determinants found in the literature, 
their relationship with capital structure theories, and supporting empirical evidence, in 
both general and REIT contexts. 
 
2.3.1 Traditional firm specific determinants of capital structure 
Firm specific characteristics consider the idiosyncratic differences among firms, either in 
the same or different industries. Morri and Beretta (2008) argue that asset tangibility, 
profitability, growth opportunities, firm size and operating risk are the more important 
capital structure determinants amongst REITs, while other potential determinants have 
little influence on capital structure determination. These factors are the most commonly 
documented in capital structure literature.30 
 
Asset Tangibility 
Tangible assets are considered to be a better collateral offering than intangible. This idea 
centers largely on more ascertainable and reliable values for real estate, both generally, 
and in the event of bankruptcy and subsequent liquidation. The perception that tangible 
assets are relatively less risky than intangible assets tends to attract debt providers. By 
implication, a firm with a more tangible asset base would have a larger propensity for 
debt. Therefore, there is an expected positive relationship between asset tangibility and 
leverage under the trade-off theory. 
 
29 For studies in the listed real estate arena that consider both book and market leverage measures, see Cashman et al 
(2016), Dogan et al (2019), and Yousef (2019), who further break down the leverage measure into short and long term 
debt.  
 
30 Frank and Goyal (2009) also believe that tangibility, size, profitability and market-to-book ratio are the leading firm-






This positive relationship is well reinforced by the literature across markets and firm 
type31. In the REIT and listed property space, Alcock and Steiner (2017) find significant 
positive effects in USA REITs between 1973 and 2011, Zarebski and Dimovski (2012) find 
the same relationship for Australian REITs, as do Suciati et al (2018) for Malaysian listed 
property firms.  
 
An alternative viewpoint is that real estate as an asset class has information asymmetry 
implications. Consensus seems divided on whether real estate is transparent or opaque 
in nature, affecting the level of information available to stakeholders outside of the firm. 
The analogous and tangible nature of real estate should provide reasonable transparency 
to outsiders, and suggests that REITs exhibit less information asymmetry, promoting 
equity issuances over debt. However, Han (2006) argues that REIT assets are difficult to 
value due to their uniqueness, complexity and illiquidity. Specialised knowledge of the 
asset class and market is required. Feng et al (2007) also state that the asymmetric costs 
for REITs can be severe, because transparency of the underlying asset is less than perfect. 
 
The pecking order interpretation differs, depending on which school of thought is 
followed. If real estate is considered informationally opaque and exhibits high 
information asymmetry costs for equity, debt will be favoured over equity. The higher 
the proportion of tangible real estate in a firm, the higher the information asymmetry, 
leading to higher debt levels. The result is an expected positive relationship, as is also 
predicted in the trade-off theory. A negative relationship is expected when real estate is 
assumed to exhibit low information asymmetry, and when the proportion of tangible 
assets in a firm is low. Bond and Scott (2006) find a significant negative relationship for 
UK listed property firms. Feng et al (2007) also observe this negative relationship for US 
REITs that had IPO’s between 1991 and 2003, as do Erol and Tirtiroglu (2011) when 
reviewing Turkish REITs between 1998 and 2007. 
 
Profitability 
If we are to presume that higher profits are a sign of financially strong firms, then such 
firms are considered to be in a better position to take on (and repay) more debt than their 
 
31 Deesomsak et al (2004) find supporting evidence in developed markets (Australia and Singapore) and developing 
markets (Malaysia and Thailand) in a 1993 to 2001 sample of non-financial firms. Song (2005) shows that the positive 
relationship exists in Swedish firms. See also Gwatidzo et al (2016) who find that this relationship holds for SA general 
firms and similarly Akinyomi and Olagunju (2013) for Nigerian general firms.   
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lesser performing counterparts. 32  Under the trade-off theory, higher profits lead to 
higher leverage ratios, a positive relationship. 
 
Conversely, under the pecking order theory, one expects a negative relationship, as firms 
with greater profits have greater retained earnings available to use at the start of the 
pecking order. The requirement for debt would be less, pointing towards a lower leverage 
ratio. On the other hand, it can be argued that since all profits in REITs are required to be 
distributed, the level of profitability or retained earnings in a REIT firm does not affect 
leverage. This notion view been highlighted by Feng et al (2007), Harrison et al (2010) 
and Versmissen and Zietz (2017). 
 
There appears to be a slight bent towards pecking order theory in the general literature.33 
Regarding REITs and listed property, all points of view are supported and refuted. Liang 
et al (2014) find a significant positive relationship for Chinese listed property firms. 
Dogan et al (2019) find evidence of positive trade-off theory association for USA and 
Canadians REITs. Harrison et al (2010) and Sant (2018) find evidence supporting pecking 
order theory for US REITs, as do Erol and Tirtiroglu (2011) in their analysis of Turkish 
REITs. Nhung et al (2017) echo the negative relationship for Vietnamese listed real estate 
firms. Feng et al (2007), Breuer et al (2018), Bond and Scott (2006), as well Alcock and 
Steiner (2017) find scant support for either trade-off theory or pecking order theory 
apropos REITs, pointing towards an insignificant (neutral) relationship. 
 
Growth opportunities 
Under the trade-off theory high growth firms are expected to exhibit lower leverage. The 
two arguments for this negative relationship are: (i) high growth firms are generally 
riskier than stable firms, and this higher risk and associated higher probability of 
financial distress results in lower leverage; and (ii), the asset structure of high growth 
firms – generally more intangible relative to tangible assets – means that they have a 
lesser ability to provide collateral for debt, again translating into lower leverage levels.  
 
 
32 An important consideration here is the proportion of a firm’s profit that is considered cash flow profit, and that which 
is non-cash profit. The ability of a firm to regularly repay debt obligations relies on excess cash flow profit. In the case 
of REITs, cash flow profit stems from the net rental income collected from properties and non-cash profit (loss) would 
feature when real estate investments held are revalued upwards (downwards) to fair market value.  
 
33 Chipeta (2018) finds significant negative relationships for non-financial firms of sub-Saharan African countries, 
including South Africa. Céspedes (2008) find a negative significant relationship in Latin American countries. Both  Chen 
(2004) and Huang and Song (2006) report the same negative relationship for Chinese general firms. 
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Under the pecking order theory the relationship ought to be positive, as high growth 
firms invest heavily in the growth phase, and therefore require substantial capital. They 
will exhaust the first call in the pecking order – retained earnings, if any – and seek debt 
to fill the void, implying higher levels of debt.  Furthermore, high growth firms may 
exhibit more information asymmetries, forcing managers to issue more debt before 
potentially costly equity. Further, REITs have limited availability of retained earnings due 
to mandatory distributions, which puts more emphasis on the debt option in the pecking 
order hierarchy. Feng et al (2007) find that REITs with high growth opportunities – as 
measured by high market to book value ratios – tend to exhibit higher leverage. They 
attribute this to managers erring on the side of financial distress costs, versus the adverse 
selection cost of information asymmetry in equity issues. 
 
A market timing theory interpretation of the growth determinant also exists. High 
market-to-book ratios signify high firm market value relative to book value. This can 
imply an overvaluation of equity scenario in which managers may take advantage by 
issuing equity. The effect is lower debt levels, a similar result to trade-off theory. 
 
The empirical evidence yields mixed results, supporting both capital structure 
arguments.  Harrison and Widjaja (2014) find significant negative coefficients both pre- 
and post the 2008 global financial crisis, using market-to-book ratios for US S&P 500 non-
financial firms, which they attribute to market timing theory. Wang (2017) performs a 
similar analysis on Canadian firms, and finds a strong negative association when using 
market leverage as a proxy, but a strong positive association when using book leverage 
as a proxy. These results seem to provide support for both the trade-off and pecking order 
theories respectively.34  
 
Support for the trade-off theory’s negative relationship with regards to REITs or listed 
property is found by Alcock et al (2010) and Alcock and Steiner (2017) in the US market, 
and Jakobsen and Olsson (2015) in the European market. Dogan et al 2019 report a 
strong negative relationship for most countries (including South Africa) in their sample 
from 2006 to 2013. The pecking order’s expected positive relationship is backed up by 
Le and Ooi (2012), who find strong support that growth as a determinant of capital 
 
34 Rajan and Zingales (1995) demonstrate pecking order preference in most G7 countries. More support for pecking 
order theory in Indian general listed firms is found by Handoo and Sharma (2014). Neither Gwatidzo et al (2016), nor 




structure follows the pecking order theory in both developed and developing property 
companies across thirteen different countries (one of which is South Africa) between 
1994 and 2007. This was echoed by Rovolis et al (2014) on a similar sample set. Zarebski 
and Dimovski (2012) also reported positive relationship between growth opportunities 
and leverage for Australian REITs. 
 
Size 
The size of a firm is representative of its maturity and stability. A firm of substantial size 
can be considered well established and would have generally more financial means and 
strength than smaller comparable firm having moved out of the initial growth phase into 
mature phase. One would expect to witness decreasing probability of financial distress 
and firm size increases. It can be argued that larger firm is relatively less risky than a 
smaller firm, which would under the trade-off theory predict a positive relationship 
between firm size and leverage.   
 
Empirical evidence supporting this relationship includes a study by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) in many of the G7 countries35. Rovolis et al (2014) also find significant positive 
relationships for 371 international real estate firms between 2005 and 2010. Their 
sample included South African real estate firms, which also exhibited this positive 
relationship. Harrison et al (2010) report positive relationships for US REITs. Yousef 
(2019) also finds significant positive relationships in both UK and GCC 36  real estate 
markets.  
 
Conversely, an argument can be made for decreasing information asymmetry costs as 
firm size increases. Established firms with a good reputation and of a critical mass may 
find it more favourable to issue better priced equity than debt. This pecking order 
prediction can equate to lower debt levels in a firm’s capital structure – a negative 
relationship between leverage and firm size. Dogan et al (2019) find a significant negative 
relationship between firm size and leverage in the USA and South Africa for both market 
leverage and book leverage measures using a 2002-2013 sample. Giambona et al (2008) 
also observe significant negative relationship for US REITs in the 1997-2003 time period. 
 
35 Wang (2017) looks at general Canadian firms and finds a significant positive relationship for firm size using both 
book and market leverage measures. Cespedes (2008) find the same relationship in Latin American countries. 
Gwatidzo et al (2016) make a similar finding for general South African listed firms.  
 
36 GCC stands for Gulf Cooperation Council and includes countries of the Gulf region – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 





Operating risk refers to variability in a firm’s core earnings, where more variability 
represents more risk and therefore a riskier firm. Firms with inconsistent earnings flirt 
more closely with the risk of bankruptcy and financial distress. The trade-off theory 
suggests that firms with higher earnings volatility and hence exhibiting greater operating 
risk will have lower leverage levels. The negative association stems from less certainty in 
earnings available to repay debt levels, affecting its ultimate debt capacity. Empirical 
support for trade-off theory in REITs or listed property has been found by Zarebski and 
Dimovski (2012), Alcock and Steiner (2017) and Breuer et al (2019). 
 
Pecking order theory suggests a contrary view. Greater volatility in earnings and cash 
flows aggravates the information asymmetry problem, meaning debt is favoured over 
potentially mispriced equity. Breuer et al (2018) concur, alluding to greater misvaluation 
when cash flows are volatile. Giambona et al (2008) find that there is a positive impact 
on US REIT leverage due to operating risk. Breuer et al (2018) find strong positive effects 
of operating risk on leverage in their US REIT sample, in line with pecking order behavior. 
Suciati et al (2018) also find a significant positive relationship in Malaysian listed 
property.37 
 
2.3.2 Other firm specific determinants of capital structure in the literature 
 
Age 
Firms of significant age are considered mature, well-established, and generally have a 
good reputation. Given their longevity, they would have survived economic and business 
cycles, market shocks or crises, and regular industry competition. These long track 
records support the notion that older firms are less risky than younger firms, and would 
exhibit a lower probability of bankruptcy. Under the trade-off theory, older firms are 
expected to have higher leverage ratios than younger firms. A contrasting view would be 
– as was the case when considering size of a firm – that information asymmetry costs are 
lower for older firms. Equity is thus favoured over debt, leading to lower debt levels.    
 
 
37 In a South African context, Chipeta (2016) observes a trade-off theory like negative association between operating 
risk and leverage in South African general firms, whilst Gwatidzo et al (2016) and Mouton and Smith (2016) find 
significant positive relationships in South African general firms - in favour of pecking order theory. 
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Gwatidzo and Ojah (2009) find a significant and positive trade-off theory relationship in 
general South African firms, in contrast to Gwatidzo et al’s (2016) strong negative results, 
in favour of the pecking order theory. Handoo and Sharma (2014), on the other hand, find 
no significant relationship in listed general Indian firms. Similarly, Nejad and 
Wassiuzzaman (2016) find no significant relationship in Malaysian firms. Neither 
Harrison et al (2010), Hardin and Wu (2010), nor Sant (2018), find any conclusive 
evidence of age affecting leverage in US REITs. 
 
Share Price Performance 
As predicted under the Baker and Wurgler (2002) version of the market timing theory, 
firms will try to time their capital structure decisions based on the under- or 
overvaluation of a firm’s equity. Thus, firm managers will attempt to time the market 
based on their perceived value of the firm’s equity relative to its traded equity value, with 
share issues occurring at times of overvaluation and share repurchases occurring at 
times of undervaluation. It is therefore generally expected to see firms experiencing 
appreciating (depreciating) share prices to exhibit lower (higher) leverage ratios, all else 
equal. This translates to an expected negative relationship between share price 
performance and leverage. 
 
Deesomsak et al (2004) find significant positive relationship in general firms in Malaysia, 
Thailand, Australia and Singapore - in favour of market timing theory. Harrison et al 
(2010) observe a significant negative relationship in US REITs. Versmissen and Zietz 
(2017) also find strong negative association in their US REIT sample covering the period 
1993 to 2013, as do Breuer et al (2019), in a slightly later sample. These results support 
the notion of market timing activity in REITs. Zarebski and Dimovski (2012) and Jakobsen 
and Olsson (2015) both produce inconclusive results for Australian and European REITs, 
respectively.   
 
Volatility and Risk 
The extent to which a firm is considered risky is said to contribute to a firm’s capital 
structure. This risk concept envisaged here is that of market risk or total firm risk 
experienced by the equity holders, and not the operating risk mentioned under a 
previous heading. The common proxies used for measuring a firm’s market risk can be 
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the firm’s beta,38 or the standard deviation (volatility) of the firm’s share price. Consistent 
with trade-off theory, an inherently risky firm would have a lower threshold for debt due 
higher financial distress concerns, as well as the higher associated debt costs. The trade-
off theory predicts a negative relationship risk and leverage.39 An alternative explanation 
is that it may be more difficult for managers to issue equity of firms displaying higher 
levels of volatility. The relative risk premium market participants may require can 
possibly deter prospective shareholders. Managers may have to issue shares at less than 
ideal prices or not all, leaving debt as the only feasible alternative, especially in the case 
of REITs. It would be feasible then that the pecking order theory would be present 
through a negative relationship. 
 
Versmissen and Zietz (2017) find a significant positive relationship between leverage and 
the equity volatility of US REITs, as do Jakobsen and Olsson (2015) for European REITs, 
lending support for the pecking order theory. Sant (2018), however, finds a marginally 
significant negative relationship, thus supporting the trade-off theory. Morri and 
Artegiani (2015) finds an insignificant negative relationship in his pre- and post-financial 
crisis REIT sample. Howton et al (2003) do not find a relationship of significance.  
 
Interest cover ratio 
The interest cover ratio, typically measured as earnings over debt interest cost, serves as 
a generally accepted measure of the debt capacity of a firm. The trade-off theory predicts 
that firms with higher interest cover ratios should have a higher debt threshold, and thus 
exhibit higher leverage. Lower interest cover ratio firms are more likely to result in 
financial difficulties in servicing debt payments, translating into a greater probability of 
financial distress. Breaking the interest cover ratio into its components highlights that 
the numerator is a profitability proxy. It may be the case that a high interest cover ratio 
will lead to lower leverage, because of the influence of the pecking order theory. However, 
the denominator of the ratio is interest cost, which can at very high levels increase the 
probability of financial distress. The movements of the numerator and denominator can 
make this variable difficult to interpret. Rovolis and Feidakis (2014) point out that a high 
ratio may be a sign that a firm has an undesirable lack of debt, or is paying off debt too 
 
38 See Sant (2018) and Morri and Artegiani (2015). Note that the detail on whether beta is adjusted to levered or 
unlevered beta is not relevant to this study, as this proxy was not been used.  
 
39 See Chen et al (2014) for comprehensive analysis of stock return volatility and capital structure. Their findings, 
consistent with trade-off theory, show that firms with high volatility actively reduce leverage.  
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quickly, rather than investing excess profits into high yielding projects. This may be due 
to policy or simply a lack of profitable projects.   
  
Harrison et al (2010) find a negative coefficient with no statistical significance in their US 
REIT sample, while Dogan et al (2019) find negative directionality of the interest cover 
ratio relative to both market and book leverage, in particular in South African and US real 
estate markets, which they indicate to be consistent with the pecking order theory. 
Handoo and Sharma (2014) also find a negative relationship between interest cover ratio 
and leverage in a sample of general Indian firms. Rovolis and Feidakis (2014) find a 
significant yet small positive coefficient in their analysis of worldwide REITs and listed 
property, including South Africa, between 2005 and 2010. 
 
Lagged Leverage 
Harrison et al (2010) include a lagged variable of the dependent variable, leverage, in 
their models. They find strongly significant positive coefficients indicating stability in 
firms’ capital structure from period to period. The premise for inclusion is that a firm’s 
capital structure is a function of the previous period’s capital structure. The lagged 
dependent variable is often used to assess whether there is strong mean reversion within 
the sample.40  
 
2.3.3 Industry specific determinants of capital structure 
Industry specific determinants refer to factors that are particular to an industry, and that 
impact capital structure. Frank and Goyal (2009) contend that the industry median 
leverage ratio is a relevant determinant of capital structure, as it serves as a benchmark 
for managers when deciding on their own firm’s leverage. Versmissen and Zietz (2017) 
include property segment specific median leverage in their analysis of US REITs, and find 
a strong positive correlation to firm level leverage ratios. Intra-industry concentration, 
competition and regulation are also potentially influential in firm level capital structure 





40 Partial adjustment models and GMM models are usually used to analyse mean reversion, target debt ratios and 
adjustment rates to mean or target ratios. These models have not been considered in this study. See Bond and Scott 




Different organisational types operate under different rules. The differing governing 
rules and regulations for alternative firm structures can possibly influence capital 
structure decision making. The relationship between different organisational structures 
and capital structure theories is not straightforward, and largely depend on the specifics 
of the structure.41 Harrison et al (2010) consider the US REIT market and the effects of 
state of incorporation, and whether a REIT belonged to the “old REIT” or “new REIT” era. 
It is found that there are slightly significant differences. Morri and Artegiani (2015) 
compare a European REIT sample to a non-REIT real estate sample, with results generally 
of the same directionality, but with differing magnitudes and significance of coefficients.   
 
The above is relevant to this study, as South Africa’s listed real estate market underwent 
a significant change of organisational structure post 2013, with PLSs and PUTs converting 
to REIT structures. Recalling that REITs have a leverage limit of 60%, while that of PUTs 
was 30%, and PLSs unlimited, it can be deduced that PUTs will have lower leverage than 
REITs and PLSs, with PLSs potentially having higher leverage than REITs. 
 
Property Type 
It has already been noted that the tangibility of assets potentially influence the 
determination of capital structure. Titman and Wessels (1988) assert that firms with 
unique or specialised products have lower debt ratios on a relative basis. Ooi (1999) finds 
that asset structure is a significant determinant in corporate debt policies of UK property 
firms. REITs can vary by type of underlying property. Ertugrul and Giambona (2011) find 
that 65% of variation in REIT capital structure can be linked to property segment.  
 
Traditional real estate categories include the retail, office, industrial and residential 
sectors. Other categories which are sometimes included in the preceding categories, or 
may be considered specialised categories, include hotels, data centers, self-storage etc. 
Definitions may vary or overlap across different REIT markets, but it is important to note 
that each category can have different revenue drivers and risk factors. A REIT may opt 
for a diversified strategy across real estate categories, or may choose to focus and 
specialise on a single category of real estate.  
 
41 In the same way that REITs are different to traditional non-real estate firms, firms within the collective real estate 
bracket may have differing structures, potentially leading to innate differences in capital structure. See Harrison et al 
(2010), who make the argument for expected capital structure differences due to organisational differences specific to 




One may infer that a REIT with a diversified portfolio of property types is naturally 
hedged as a result of income streams across categories. Lenders may find that collateral 
spread across multiple categories is more appealing than a single strategy alternative. 
Brown and Riddiough (2003) state that debt capacity can vary markedly between 
property type, as more stable cashflows tend to support higher debt levels.  Giambona et 
al (2008) find that firms focusing of what are considered most (least) liquid property 
types use more (less) leverage. Dogan et al (2019) observe lower average leverage ratios 
in specialised property types than other more common property types. A possible 
relationship between the underlying composition of a REIT‘s property portfolio and its 
capital structure exists. It would seem to most resemble elements of the trade-off theory, 
where the less risky types of property would provide enhanced debt capacity. 
 
In other literature, Chikolwa’s (2011) results show that retail property has a marginal 
and significant positive effect on total debt ratios in Australian REITs. Harrison et al 
(2010) observe that regional malls exhibit higher leverage, and storage facilities lower 
leverage, relative to a diversified base case. Bond and Scott (2006) found little evidence 
of any property type association with leverage levels.  
 
2.3.4 Country specific determinants of capital structure 
 
A further factor of interest is how a country’s economic, social or geographic elements 
can influence the capital structures of firms within that country, often but not always, 
relative to another country. Various studies put the importance of country factors above 
that of firm specific factors - for example, Booth et al (2001) suggest that leverage tends 
to increase the greater the maturity of the capital markets in question. Other 
considerations are countries’ legal systems, political risk, and economic conditions.  
 
Rovolis et al (2014) studied the specific economic and urban effect of a country in their 
worldwide sample, and found significant negative influence for South African listed 
property relative to other countries in the sample. Cashman et al (2016) consider 
economic and political factors influencing capital structures of Asian listed real estate and 
conclude that firms with properties located in countries with higher degrees of political 
risk and instability employ less debt than counterparts in politically stable countries. 
Dogan et al (2019) perform an analysis considering all the differing REIT specific rules 
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across different REIT regimes, and find that REIT regimes with higher payout ratios have 
higher leverage. They also find statistical significance for GDP growth as a determinant of 
capital structure in the US and Canada. Rovolis and Feidakis (2014) found GDP growth 
had a negative correlation with leverage ratios in worldwide REITs. Le and Ooi (2012) 
consider the development of bond and equity markets of different countries, specifically 
within the real estate industry. They find that the greater the maturity of the debt market, 
the greater the debt ratios.   
 
Market Interest Rates 
The prevailing market interest rates of a country can play a role in firm decisions on 
capital structure. Market interest rates are proxies for a firm’s cost of debt, with the 
explicit firm cost of debt generally being priced off market lending rates at a point in time, 
plus a spread that depends on its quality and credit rating.42 Economic theory suggests 
that the lower the cost of debt, the more incentive firms will have to borrow. Trade-off 
theory further adds that higher costs of debt lead to firms experiencing financial distress, 
with increase probability of default. Thus the expectation is that lower (higher) interest 
rates, or cost of debt, lead to higher (lower) debt levels; thus an inverse relationship. 
Closely linked to this is the notion that firms will want to time these interest rate cycles 
to their benefit. Harrison et al (2010) highlight that when the market interest rates are 
high, firms are reluctant to commit to long term debt funding. In survey studies by 
Graham and Harvey (2001) in the US and Brounen et al (2006) in Europe, managers 
acknowledged that prevailing interest rates were a factor when considering their firm’s 
capital structure. 
 
Under both the trade-off theory and market timing theory, a negative relationship is 
expected between market interest rates and leverage. Harrison et al (2010) report a 
strongly significant negative relationship between the 10 year treasury rate and leverage 
of US REITs, which they ascribe to market timing theory.  Cashman et al (2016) present 
evidence of the US 10 year treasury rate having small negative effects on leverage in their 
model focused on the Asian real estate market. Morri and Artegiani (2015) also reports 
negative coefficients for both the pre- and post-global financial crisis periods in the 
European real estate market. Rovolis and Feidakis (2014) consider the government bond 
 
42 Another noteworthy relationship not within the scope of this study is the impact of credit ratings on leverage, see 




yields as interest rate proxies in worldwide REIT markets between 2005 and 2010, 
including South Africa, and find significant negative coefficients lending support to the 
trade-off and market timing theories.43   
 
Inflation  
Frank and Goyal (2009) postulate that expected inflation in the economic environment is 
a primary driver of capital structure decision making. Their reasoning, following trade-
off theory logic, is that the value of the tax shield is higher when inflation is higher. Thus, 
firms will increase debt levels in periods of high inflation. Nejad and Wasiuzzaman (2016) 
find that this relationship holds for non-financial Malaysian firms.  
 
The expectation for tax exempt REITs may not be as clear cut, as the tax shield advantage 
is not relevant. Le and Ooi (2012) find positive effects of inflation of debt levels in their 
cross country analysis, including South Africa. They argue that firms in higher inflation 
countries will use more debt in their capital structure to hedge against inflation risk. 
Breuer et al (2019) found negative but non-significant coefficients in their analysis of US 
REITs. Howton et al (2003) analyse equity and debt issues of US REITs between 1993 and 
2001, and find that debt levels have an inverse relationship with inflation. Erol and 
Tirtiroglu (2011) find negative coefficients when analysing Turkish REITs, and argue that 
inflation is a hindrance when contracting for long term debt.  
2.4 Concluding on the literature and hypotheses development 
This study primarily aims to investigate the impact of capital structure determinants on 
leverage usage in the South African listed property market over the transition period to 
REITs. The literature review has taken into account extant literature and empirical 
evidence of both general and listed property and REIT capital structure studies. Table 1 
summarises the determinants and associated theories, with supporting empirical 
evidence, from predominantly listed property and REIT based literature. The 
determinants outlined form the basis for the hypothesis testing on the South African 





43 They also analyse the cost of debt using the ratio of interest expense to debt. Whilst this metric is more a firm specific, 
the strongly negative result supports of either the trade-off theory, or the market timing theory. See Rovolis et al (2014) 
for similar result.   
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Relationship Evidence in Literature 
Tangibility  
 
+ (Trade-off theory) 
 
 
- (Pecking order 
theory) 
 
Rajan & Zingales (1995); Gwatidzo et al (2016); Chikolwa (2011); 
Harrison et al (2010); Alcock & Steiner (2017); Zarebski & Dimovski 
(2012) 
 




- (Trade-off theory) 
 
 
- (Market timing 
theory) 
 
+ (Pecking order 
theory) 
 
Rajan & Zingales (1995); Deesomsak et al (2004); Chikolwa (2011); 
Alcock & Steiner (2017); Dogan et al (2019); Harrison et al (2010); 
 
Harrison & Widjaja (2014); 
 





+ (Trade-off theory) 
 
- (Pecking order 
theory) 
 
Liang et al (2014); Dogan et al (2019) 
 
Rajan & Zingales (1995); Fama & French (2002); Gwatidzo & Ojah 
(2009); Nhung et al (2017); Harrison et al (2010); Sant (2018) 
Firm size 
 
+ (Trade-off theory) 
 
 
- (Pecking order 
theory) 
 
Rajan & Zingales (1995); Deesomsak et al (2004); Gwatidzo et al 
(2016); Harrison et al (2010); Rovolis et al (2014); Yousef (2019) 
 
Howton et al (2003); Giambona et al (2008); Dogan et al (2019); 
Breuer et al (2019) 
Operating risk 
 
- (Trade-off theory) 
 
+ (Pecking order 
theory) 
 
Alcock & Steiner (2017); Zarebski & Dimovski (2012); Breuer et al 
(2019) 
 
Giambona et al (2008); Gwatidzo et al (2016); Breuer et al (2018); 
Suciati et al (2018) 
Lagged Leverage 
 
+/- (No clear 
connection to CS 
theories) 
 
Harrison et al (2010); Bond & Scott (2006) 
Firm age 
 
+ (Trade-off theory) 
 
- (Pecking order 
theory) 
 
Gwatidzo & Ojah (2009); Wong (2017) 
 








Deesomsak et al (2004); Howton et al (2003); Harrison et al (2010); 
Versmissen & Zietz (2017); Breuer et al (2019) 
Volatility 
 
- (Trade-off theory) 
 
+ (Pecking order 
theory) 
 
Wang et al (2014); Morri & Artegiani (2015); Sant (2018) 
 





+ (Trade-off theory) 
 
 





+/- (No clear 
connection to CS 
theories) 
 
Harrison et al (2010); Morri & Artegiani (2015);  
Property type 
 
+/- (No clear 
connection to CS 
theories) 
 




- (Market timing 
theory) 
- (Trade off theory) 
 
Harrison et al (2010); Morri & Artegiani (2015); Cashman et al (2016) 
Rovolis et al (2014); Rovolis & Feidakis (2014) 
Inflation 
 
+ (Trade-off theory) 
 
 
Frank & Goyal (2009); Breuer et al (2019) 
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
This chapter focuses on the data collection process, the selection and defining of 
independent and dependent variables, and the defining of the various model equations 
that represent the tests and regressions utilised in this study for the purpose of 
answering the research questions. 
3.1 Sample and data collection 
The sample for this study comprised of South African listed property (PLSs, PUTs and 
REITs) that were listed on the JSE for the period 2005 to 2019.44 The time period was 
selected to give a reasonable total sample size and sufficient observations both before 
and after the 2013 introduction of the South African REIT regime. Firms that were 
delisted, renamed, taken over or merged were, as far as possible, included in the sample 
in order to avoid survivorship bias. Firms for which specific variables were not available 
were excluded and only firms with at least two clear regressible firm years were included 
in the sample. The dependent and independent variables were collected from Bloomberg 
database and annual financial statements of the sample firms.  
 
After allowing for loss of observations due to use of lagged variables the final sample 
consists of 39 individual listed property firms, and a total of 314 firm year observations. 
This sample consists of both firms classified as REITs in the REIT era (137 observations), 
and PUTs (53 observations) and PLSs (124 observations) in the pre REIT era.45 The data 
is both cross sectional and a time series in nature, and thus constitutes a panel data set, 
being a combination of cross section of firms analyzed over a period of time. Not all firms 
are represented in every year between 2005 and 2019, thus resulting in an unbalanced 
panel. Appendix 7 contains the list of firms and respective firm years used in the sample.  
3.2 The dependent variable 
As discussed earlier, various proxies of leverage have been used in the literature. The 
version of leverage chosen for this study was total interest bearing debt to total assets, 
which is a book value ratio. The book value ratio is more relevant in the context of the 
research objectives. The imposed South African REIT debt limit is based on the book value 
 
44 It is noted that some firms may either be dual listed or listed on the JSE, but domiciled in another jurisdiction. The 
firms included in the sample are only those that are strictly considered South African REITs being those that fall under 
the South African REIT regime. 
 
45 Only one non REIT entity exists post 2013, Liberty Two Degrees (L2D) has not yet converted to a REIT and is still 
classified a PUT. 
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of total assets, and creditors are more concerned with leverage ratios based on the book 
value of assets held as collateral.46 Market leverage measures are not altogether relevant 
for creditors holding collateral, and do not feature in the regulatory debt limits. 
Furthermore, since the market value of a firm is constantly changing and not within 
managers’ influence, to gain an insight into actual and active capital structure decision 
making book leverage is more appropriate (Versmissen & Zietz, 2017). Total interest 
bearing debt (long and short term) is the more important leverage component, as it 
incurs a tangible cost of debt and has associated costs of financial distress. The dependent 
variable selection and definition is the most appropriate and relevant measure of 
leverage when analyzing the capital structure of the South African listed property firms 
in this sample, and its use is in line with studies by Chikolwa (2011), Versmissen and Zietz 
(2017) and Breuer et al (2018). 
 
Of importance in this particular leverage definition is that the total interest bearing debt 
used was only that owed to external third party funders. Any internal or intercompany 
financing arrangements were excluded. Furthermore, with regards to the PLS specific 
observations, the linked debenture financing instruments 47  that were historically 
characteristic of these the previous listed property structure have also been excluded in 
this study. The debenture holders and equity holders are one and the same, and this 
structure more resembles quasi-equity than pure debt. As the objective in this study was 
to ascertain the true leverage within real estate firms, the debenture structures would 
overstate this, and therefore were excluded from the analysis. 
3.3 Explanatory variables  
The following section describes all the explanatory variables selected for the analysis. 
Table 2 provides all variables included in the study along with abbreviations used in 
regression results, definitions, and references to REIT literature supporting the use of 
these variables in capital structure analysis.
 
46 Creditors, typically through loan covenants, consider the loan-to-value ratio, the ratio of net property investment to 
total debt. Given the inherently high proportion of property in a REIT’s total asset base, the assumption is made that 
one approximates the other. Furthermore, the real estate portfolios of listed property firms are generally revalued by 
external independent third parties annually, so their book values should be fairly close to market values. This creates 
a sense of comfort for creditors. 
 
47 A linked debenture in this context is a linked unit consisting of a share and debenture. They cannot be separated and 
are traded together in a similar manner to the stapled structures used in Australian REITs. The debenture is often 
shown as a liability and attracts interest which is recognised at interest expense in the financial statements of a PLS. 
Without contesting technical status of the instrument too much, it is not considered debt when ascertaining leverage 
levels of a firm. 
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Table 2: Variables for determinants of capital structure used in study 













Book leverage Lev Ratio of Total interest bearing Debt to Total Assets 
Chikolwa (2011), Jakobsen & Olsson 
(2015); Versmissen & Zietz (2017); 




Tangibility  Tang Ratio of Net Property Investments to Total Assets 
Harrison et al (2010); Ooi & Le (2012); 







Growth Market to Book ratio [ratio of Market Capitalisation to book value of equity]  Rovolis et al (2014); Ooi & Le (2012); Versmissen & Zietz (2017);  
 
Bloomberg database 
Profitability  Prof Ratio of EBITDA to Total Assets 
Ooi & Le (2012); Alcock & Steiner 
(2017); Morri & Artegiani (2015); Breuer 




Firm Size Size Natural log of Total Assets 
Ooi & le (2012); Jakobsen & Olsson 
(2015); Rovolis et al (2014); Breuer et al 




Firm Age Age Years since firms initial listing on JSE 
Hardin & Wu (2010); Harrison et al 




Share Volatility Vol Standard deviation of firms traded equity for the 12 months preceding the leverage observation 
Howton et al (2003); Jakobsen & Olsson 
(2015); Versmissen & Zietz (2017) 
 
Bloomberg database 
Share Performance Perf Share price movement in firms traded equity for the 12 months preceding the leverage observation 
Harrison et al (2010); Jakobsen & Olsson 
(2015); Versmissen & Zietz (2017); 
Breuer et al (2019) 
 
Bloomberg database 
















Dummy variables, jointly 0 for REIT, OTypePUT = 1 for PUT zero otherwise, 
OTypePLS = 1 for PLS zero otherwise.  







Property Type PType Dummy variable, value of 0 for Diversified property portfolio, value of 1 for single strategy property portfolio 
Bond & Scott (2006); Chikolwa (2011); 







Inflation Inf South African annual inflation rate, measured by Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the year of observation 
Howton et al (2003); Le and Ooi (2012); 





MRate Average yield over 12 months in the South African R186 government bond yield in the year of observation, aligned to each firm’s financial year end 
Harrison et al (2010); Morri & Artegiani 





3.3.1 Traditional firm specific variables used in the regression model 
In line with extant literature as discussed in the previous chapter, all traditional firm specific 
determinants, with the exception of operating risk, were selected for this study. Typically, 
operating risk is calculated by the variation or standard deviation of a firm’s earnings. Given 
the small sample size, inclusion of this variable in any effective form would have resulted in a 
significant loss of observations, and it was thus omitted as an explanatory variable in this study.   
 
The definitions of the variables also follow that of existing literature. Thus, tangibility (Tang) is 
the ratio of net property investment over total assets, growth opportunities (Growth) is the 
market-to-book ratio, firm size (Size) is the natural logarithm of total assets, and profitability 
(Profit), is EBITDA scaled by total assets.48 
 
3.3.2 Additional firm specific variables used in the regression model  
The additional firm specific determinants found in capital structure literature that were 
included in the regression models were firm age (Age), calculated as years since a firm’s listing, 
share price performance (Perf), being the last 12 months movement in a firm’s traded equity, 
share price volatility (Vol) proxied by the standard deviation of the firm’s share price for the 
previous 12 months, and interest cover ratio (ICR), calculated as the net property income over 
interest expense for a given year being observed.49 In addition, an autoregressive variable, 
lagged leverage (LagLev), which is the dependent variable lagged by one year, was included.  
 
3.3.3 Industry specific variables used in analysis 
The first industry specific variables selected for the model is the organisational structure of the 
firm, OTypePUT and OTypePLS. These dummy variables with the base case (zero value), 
representing a REIT under the South African REIT regime implemented in 2013. OTypePUT 
takes on a value of 1 if the company is a PUT (i.e. neither REIT nor PLS). Similarly, OTypePLS 
takes on a value of 1 if the company is PLS (i.e. neither REIT nor PLS). This is an important 
inclusion, as it aims to test for possible material differences in leverage between the pre-REIT 
 
48  EBITDA was adjusted for non-recurring and exceptional items - effectively net property related income and fair value 
adjustments on investment properties. Harrison et al (2010) use funds from operations, which was not an easily obtainable 
metric for this sample. Morri and Artegiani (2015) and Breuer et al (2018), amongst others, use EBITDA as a proxy for 
profitability.  
 
49 The use of net property income instead of EBITDA differs slightly from some of the literature. The ICR serves as a measure 
of a firm’s regular and ongoing ability to repay a level of debt. It is the author’s opinion that this is better measured by assessing 
only the net property income (cashflows) streaming off the property portfolio, and not included non-cash flow fair value profits 
that will skew this ratio. Furthermore, interest expense associated with debentures in PLSs has also been excluded as it is not 
reflective of a firm’s ability to repay creditors.   
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and REIT organisational structures, and thus whether the implementation of REIT legislation 
had an impact of leverage in the South African listed property sector. 
 
Similarly, a dummy variable (PType) for differentiation of a firm’s underlying property type 
was included. Unlike other studies that differentiate across various property segments, the 
categorisation for this study is simplified into either diversified (a firm’s property portfolio 
consisting of more than one segment), or single strategy (a firm’s property portfolio consisting 
purely of one segment), with the base case being the former (dummy variable = 0), and the 
alternative case the latter (dummy variable = 1). 
  
3.3.3 Country specific variables used in analysis 
Country factors specific to South Africa are also included to ascertain any potential influence of 
country specific macroeconomic factors on the capital structures of the sample firms. 
 
Thus South African inflation (Inf), as approximated by the Consumer Price Index, was included 
as an independent variable. The prevailing market interest rates in South Africa (MRate) are 
represented by the 12 month average R186 government bond yield in the year of observation, 
aligned to each firm’s financial year end date. 
 
Same period explanatory variables were preferred to one period lagged explanatory variables, 
save for LagLev. It is the author’s contention that the variables in the current period are more 
appropriate as management know, at all times, the inner workings and performance of the firm. 
Management can react to information not yet public and make capital structure decisions on 
the most up to date information. One period lagged variables have an inherent delay and can 
be based on outdated information, possibly undermining their accuracy in assessing capital 
structure choices. Harrison et al (2010), Yousef (2019) and Sant (2018) use same period 
explanatory variables. 
3.4 Model Specification 
A panel regression model is constructed to ascertain the effect of specified capital structure 
determinants, the explanatory variables, on the dependent variable of the sample firms over 
the specified sample time period. The use of panel data has the advantage of controlling for 
heterogeneity across groups or categories in this case the group of sample firms with the South 
African listed property sector. Put differently, each firm within the category would have 
idiosyncratic differences that would not be controlled for in an ordinary regression.  
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The use of panel regression controls for heterogeneity within the group being analyzed and 
also controls for any unobservable firm specific effects. Lemmon et al (2008) state that the 
majority of variation is a firm’s capital structure is explained by unobserved firm specific effects 
and failure to control for these can lead to omitted variable bias. Failing to take this into account 
can lead to model misspecification.50 Possible firm specific or unobserved factors not explicitly 
taken into account in the model and not easily measurable within the sample firms are firm 
culture, the risk appetite or conservatism of management, managerial skill and ability, or 
‘desire’ to maintain either a target debt ratio or financial flexibility in the capital structure, or 
the external imposition of debt covenants and creditor monitoring.  Having considered the 
theoretical and empirical literature the following panel regression is constructed, hereafter 
referred to as the “full model”:51 
 
Book Leverage = f(traditional firm specific variables, additional firm specific variables, industry 
specific variables, country specific variables, error term)  
 
Formulaically:  LEVit =     α + βXXit + βXX’it + βYYit+ βZZit + εit   (1)  
Where: 
α = Constant/intercept 
i = Firm 
t = Year of observation 
LEV = The dependent variable, Book Leverage 
X  = Vector of explanatory traditional firm specific variables for firm i over time t,        
including Tang, Growth, Profit, Size 
X’  = Vector of explanatory additional firm specific variables for firm i over time t,  
including Age, Perf, Vol, ICR, LagLev 
Y  = Vector of explanatory industry specific variables for firm i over time t, including  
OTypePUT, OTypePLS, PType 
Z  = Vector of explanatory country specific variables for firm i over time t, including  
MRate, Inf 
β  = Coefficients of the explanatory variables 
ε = Error term, where the ε takes into account the residual error term and unobserved  
firm specific effects 
 
50 Matemilola (2013) find higher R squared ratio in a panel fixed effects model versus OLS model when assessing capital 
structure determinants in a South African sample of firms. They ascribed this to unobservable firm specific effects, such as 
managerial ability, and cite observable determinants do not capture all variation capital structure across firms.  
 
51 Vermissen and Zietz (2017), Breuer et al (2018), Morri and Artegiani (2015) use panel regression in their analyses. Table 2 




Before running the full model a regression is performed on just the traditional firm specific 
variables (X) and the organizational type dummy variables OTypePUT and OTypePLS. The 
remaining variables are then added to this initial regression, hereafter referred to as the 
“simplified model”. Extant literature focuses chiefly on select firm specific variables influencing 
capital structure, in some cases dismissing any other possible explanatory options. This 
approach helps analyze whether additional variables add any explanatory power to the 
traditional model and whether the sign and significance of the traditional firm specific 
variables change.  
3.5 Appropriateness and diagnostic tests  
The sample data was tested for normality using the Shapiro Wilk test. The results of the test 
show that the data is not normally distributed. Histogram charts of each variable were also 
reviewed which showed approximate normal distributions. The non-normality of data can 
cause issues in interpretation of regression results. However, for large enough samples the 
Central Limit Theorem indicates that regression coefficients do in fact tend to normality even 
without residuals that are normally distributed (Wooldridge, 2013).52 For the purposes of this 
study, this sample set of 314 observations is deemed large enough to prevent any non-
normality of the residuals from hindering the regression results analysis. 
 
Tests for multicollinearity are performed using pairwise correlation matrix and Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) indicators. The variables Size and Age show a degree of correlation which 
is not unexpected. Both the correlation matrix, Appendix 8, and VIF indicators, indicate that 
multicollinearity is not an issue in the sample. The modified Wald test was performed and 
showed the presence of heteroskedasticity within the sample. Heteroskedasticity occurs when 
the variances of the error terms in a regression are not constant. This can result in 
misestimation of the standard errors of independent variable coefficients which can lead to 
misleading inferences. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation of residuals was also 
performed which revealed that autocorrelation was detected within the sample. 
Autocorrelation refers to the correlation of observations of variables over a time period and in 
the context of regression analysis correlation of error terms over time. In the presence of 
autocorrelation conclusions in respect of statistical significance of coefficients can be 
 
52 Wooldridge (2013) states that sample sizes as low as 30 are sufficient for the Central Limit Theorem to apply. Many studies 
in relevant literature use similar sample sizes with similar variables in similar models. See Nhung et al (2017) that use 204 




misleading due to the invalidity of regular t and F tests of significance.   The heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation problems are addressed by the use of robust standard errors within the 
regression. 
 
Within panel data there are options of fixed effects, random effects or OLS regressions. Fixed 
effects are time-invariant and often unobserved effects specific to each individual observation 
within a group in a study, in this case firms, and can be correlated with the other explanatory 
variables in the model. The fixed effect model can address omitted variable bias thereby 
improving the model. Random effects assumes that the individual specific effect is uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables in the model.  
 
Tests to determine which options of panel regression are appropriate were performed for both 
the full model and simplified model. The first test, F-test, checks the suitability of fixed effects 
regression versus OLS regression and whether heterogeneity is present in the cross section of 
firms in the sample. Assuming fixed effects is appropriate the Hausman test is performed to 
test whether a fixed effects model or a random effects model is the better model. If the result 
confirms fixed effects, then fixed effects is used. If the Hausman test confirms random effects 
use then the Breusch Pagan Lagrange multiplier test is performed to select between random 
effects regression or OLS regression. At this point a further F-test is performed to check 
whether time fixed effects are potentially significant. Time fixed effects are interpreted as 
heterogeneity between time periods or the time series element of this sample. In chapter four 
the results of these tests are discussed and fixed effects, random effects and OLS regressions 









CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
This chapter discusses the descriptive statistics and results of the regression models, as this 
pertains to the research questions and theories of capital structure.  
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The summary statistics of the data used for this study are presented in Table 3. The mean 
leverage ratio for South African listed property over the sample period was 28.2%. The mean 
leverage ratio for REITs only is 31.2%, for PUTs it is 16.8%, and for PLSs is 29.8%. The majority 
of the leverage ratio observations in the distribution lie within the 20% to 40% range. The 
maximum REIT leverage ratio is 62.2%.53 Figure 1 depicts the leverage ratios over the sample 
period timeline. Understandably, due to their debt restrictions, PUTs exhibited lower leverage 
than PLSs before the introduction of the REIT regime. After the introduction of REITs in South 
Africa in 2013, PUTs that converted to REITs took advantage of the additional allowance for 
debt with their leverage ratios increasing. PLSs converting to REITs had a similar reaction, but 
to a lesser degree. The mean leverage ratio for REITs only of 31.2% suggests that the REIT 
status has on average increased the overall usage of debt in the South African listed property 
space since its introduction.  
 
On average, REITs in South Africa operate well below the REIT regulatory debt limit of 60%. 
The gap between the observed leverage and this prescribed debt limit suggest more scope for 
increasing leverage should the firms wish to. That prescribed debt limit does not appear to be 
hampering firms’ ability or desire to take on more debt. Considering just the borrowing 
capacity available, relative to the prescribed debt limit, it appears that REITs in South Africa 
err on the side of conservatism with regard to debt usage in their capital structures. A possible 
reason for this is that firms may wish to maintain larger buffers relative to the limits in case of 
external shocks, market downturns, or liquidity issues.54 By maintaining a buffer firms have 
the financial flexibility to withstand market fluctuations and also maintain the ability to use 
debt for investment. Furthermore, it is a possibility that a firm’s debt level congruent to its level 
of financial distress simply lies below the prescribed debt limit.  
 
53 Rebosis (REB) had a leverage ratio of 62.2% (above the 60% limit) in 2019. This was largely attributable to heavy write-offs 
of real estate assets over the previous few years trading – a period of general decline for the entire South African listed property 
sector.  This company was not the only one to experience write-offs and increases in leverage, but was the only one to breach 
the regulatory leverage restriction. Appendix 9 shows selected larger firms from the sample and their leverage ratios over the 
sample period. 
 
54 The large write offs of real estate assets in recent years in South Africa are a good example of this. On average the leverage 
ratio in South African REITs has increased over the last 3 years some of which is attributable to a reduction of asset value 








Minimum Maximum 25th P'tile Median 75th P'tile 
Leverage 
     
0.282  
                      
0.111  
                  -   
            
0.623  
             
0.210  
      
0.298  
             
0.367  
Tangibility 
     
0.851  
                      
0.123  
           
0.365  
            
0.996  
             
0.803  
      
0.890  
             
0.943  
Growth 
     
0.938  
                      
0.179  
           
0.067  
            
1.522  
             
0.848  
      
0.942  
             
1.040  
Size 
     
8.863  
                      
1.223  
           
4.836  
         
11.862  
             
8.137  
      
8.908  
             
9.523  
Profitability 
     
0.100  
                      
0.073  
-         
0.110  
            
0.811  
             
0.067  
      
0.086  
             
0.116  
PUT 
     
0.169  
                      
0.375  
                  -   
            
1.000  
                    -                -                        -   
PLS 
     
0.395  
                      
0.490  
                  -   
            
1.000  
                    -                -    
             
1.000  
Lagged Leverage 
     
0.211  
                      
0.080  
                  -   
            
0.449  
             
0.162  
      
0.228  
             
0.269  
Interest Cover Ratio 
     
3.782  
                      
2.040  
                  -   
            
8.000  
             
2.372  
      
3.235  
             
4.685  
Age 
     
9.637  
                      
6.860  
           
1.000  
         
32.000  
             
4.000  
      
8.000  
          
13.000  
Property Type 
     
0.404  
                      
0.492  
                  -   
            
1.000  
                    -                -    
             
1.000  
Performance 
     
0.082  
                      
0.254  
-         
0.954  
            
1.170  
-           
0.066  
      
0.076  
             
0.228  
Volatility 
     
0.061  
                      
0.039  
           
0.003  
            
0.326  
             
0.040  
      
0.053  
             
0.075  
Inflation 
     
0.054  
                      
0.016  
           
0.020  
            
0.093  
             
0.044  
      
0.052  
             
0.063  
Market Interest Rate 
     
0.083  
                      
0.005  
           
0.074  
            
0.089  
             
0.079  
      
0.083  
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4.2 Regression results 
The appropriate panel regression tests were conducted for both the simplified and full models. 
For the simplified model the F-test (p value < 0.000) and Hausman test (p value = 0.08) 
indicated that a random effects model is appropriate. This was further confirmed by the 
Breusch Pagan test (p value < 0.000), which eliminated an OLS regression as an option. The 
same approach was followed for the full model, resulting in a fixed effects regression being 
selected as the most appropriate (F test p value < 0.000; Hausman test p value < 0.006).   
 
Time fixed effects tests were also conducted to check whether time fixed effects would be 
suitable. Whilst the tests prove time fixed effects may be suitable, multicollinearity with the 
industry and country specific variables resulted in time fixed effects not being included in the 
models. The full model with fixed effects shows a higher R-squared than that of the simplified 
random effects model with just the traditional variables. All else equal the addition of additional 
variables improves the goodness of fit of the sample. The regression results for both the 
simplified and traditional models are presented in Table 4 (see next page). 
 
The Size variable is found to be statistically significant at the 10% significance level, with a 
positive coefficient in both the simplified and full models.  South African listed property firms 
in the sample thus exhibit higher levels of leverage the larger they are in size - in this case 
measured by total assets. This follows the trade-off theory that larger firms with larger asset 
bases will have a higher capacity for debt, and therefore higher leverage ratios. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Rovolis et al (2014), Yousef (2019), and Versmissen and Zietz 
(2017).  
 
Tangibility (Tang) has a positive coefficient but is not found to be statistically significant. The 
directionality of the coefficient suggest support for the trade-off theory, as was found by Breuer 
et al (2018), and Alcock and Steiner (2017). A possible explanation of the lack of statistical 
significance is that listed South African property firms are inherently rich in tangible assets, 
with very limited intangible assets, which possibly limits the variation in this factor across the 
sample. In their research in multiple REIT jurisdictions, Dogan et al (2019) also find a positive 







Table 4: Regression output for determinants of capital structure 
 Simplified Model Full Model 
 Random Effects Fixed effects 
Tangibility (Tang) 0.102 0.0687 
 (0.77) (0.64) 
   
Growth Opportunities (Growth) 0.0473 0.0674** 
 (1.18) (3.08) 
   
Firm Size (Size) 0.0249* 0.0427* 
 (2.45) (2.22) 
   
Profitability (Profit) -0.157** 0.0225 
 (-2.67) (0.34) 
   
PUT (OTypePUT) -0.137*** -0.0825** 
 (-7.89) (-3.37) 
   
PLS (OTypePLS) 0.0052 0.0079 
 (0.32) (0.49) 
   
Lagged Leverage (LagLev)  0.497*** 
  (3.81) 
   
Interest Cover Ratio (ICR)  -0.0117** 
  (-2.93) 
   
Firm Age (Age)  -0.006 
  (-1.61) 
   
Property Type (PType)  - 
  - 
   
Share Performance (Perf)  -0.0571*** 
  (-4.19) 
   
Share Volatility (Vol)  0.382* 
  (2.50) 
   
Inflation (Inf)  -0.888*** 
  (-4.39) 
   
Market Interest Rate (MRate)  -0.294 
  (-0.40) 
   
Constant -0.0239 -0.158 
 (-0.14) (-0.77) 
Observations 314 314 
R2 0.271 0.485 








The profitability (Prof) variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in the 
simplified model, but after the addition of the other variables of the full model the coefficient 
changes to positive with no significance. The simplified model result is in line with pecking 
order theory predictions, and consistent with the findings of Harrison et al (2010) and Sant 
(2018). However, the lack of statistical significance of the full model is consistent with the 
findings of Feng et al (2007) and Breuer et al (2018). Given that in most cases near-full profits 
are paid out on a mandatory basis, there is a possible irrelevance of profitability as a 
determinant of REIT capital structure, at least within the context of this study.  
 
Growth opportunities, represented by Growth, is statistically significant at 5% with a positive 
coefficient for the full model, but not statistically significant in the simplified model. It would 
thus appear that when growth opportunities are high, as measured by high market to book 
ratios, leverage levels for South African listed property firms tend to increase. High growth 
firms may, as suggested by Feng et al (2007), experience higher information asymmetry costs, 
and prefer to lean towards debt than to be exposed to an adverse selection problem when 
issuing equity. This result provides support for the pecking order theory, in line with results 
found by Le and Ooi (2012) and Zarebski and Dimovski (2012). The finding is, however, 
contrary to the negative relationship found by Chikolwa (2011), Breuer et al (2019) and Dogan 
et al (2019).  
 
The dummy variables for organisational type OTypePUT and OTypePLS, behave as expected. 
OTypePUT is negative and statistically significant (at the 1% or 5% level, depending on the 
model), meaning that PUTs exhibited lower leverage than REITs over the sample period. Given 
that PUTs had a regulatory enforced leverage restriction of 30%, as opposed to the 60% of 
REITs, this result was expected. OTypePLS has a positive coefficient but it is not statistically 
significant. The positive sign of the coefficient is credible, given the lack of any regulatory debt 
restrictions that existed on PLSs, as opposed to the restriction on debt in REITs. 
 
The lagged leverage variable, LagLev, is positive and significant at a 1% level consistent with 
Harrison et al (2010). The interest cover ratio, ICR, is negative in sign and significant at a 5% 
level. The result is opposite to that expected in the trade-off theory and that found by Rovolis 
and Feidakis (2014) but is consistent for with the findings of Dogan et al (2019) and Handoo 
and Sharma (2014) supporting pecking order theory. Another explanation is perhaps South 
African REITs with high interest cover ratios either choose to maintain a certain level of debt 
regardless their greater ability to afford debt. This may be attributable to having a clear 
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leverage policy that involves financial flexibility and prudence or due to restrictions imposed 
by covenants of debt. Alternatively they may choose to reduce debt from excess profits when 
there are no imminent return yielding projects available for investment. 
 
Firm age, Age, is found to be statistically non-significant, with negative sign. This suggests that 
the age of a South African listed real estate firm does not have any correlation with its leverage 
levels, and there is therefore no evidence of any capital structure theory at play with regards 
to this variable. Harrison et al (2010) and Sant (2018) report the same result and lack of 
statistical significance. 
 
The property type variable, PType, was omitted from the fixed effects regression due to 
collinearity. That is, PType, is constant over time for each firm. A fixed effects approach 
inherently accounts for time-invariant elements, and this explains the existence of collinearity 
with regards to PType. Given its omission from the fixed effects regression, its random effects 
result was considered. PType under the random effects regression exhibits a negative 
coefficient, and is found to be strongly statistically significant at a 1% level. The interpretation 
is that South African listed property firms with a single property type focus use less leverage. 
This is plausible if one considers that a diversified property portfolio is less risky than a focused 
property portfolio, and hence can both afford and obtain potentially more debt. This result is 
consistent with Harrison et al (2010) and Chikolwa (2011) who find that property type has an 
effect on the leverage ratio.  
 
The twelve-month performance of a firm’s shares (Perf) is shown to be negatively correlated 
to its percentage debt of used. This result is statistically significant at a 1% significance level. 
This finding is consistent with those of Versmissen and Zietz (2017) and Breuer et al (2019), 
and supports the market timing theory with regards to the sample firms. Thus, firms in the 
South African listed property sector exhibit lower leverage in times of appreciating share 
prices, suggesting that managers may try to time the market and issue equity, or at least 
relatively more equity than debt, in these favourable conditions. 
 
The share price volatility of a firm, Vol, yields an interesting result. A positive coefficient with 
significance at the 10% level is reported which suggests that firms with more volatile share 
prices have higher leverage. The result offers support for pecking order theory consistent with 
the findings of Versmissen and Zietz (2017) and Jakobsen and Olsson (2015). To the extent a 
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firm’s equity is considered more volatile and risky, managers may be reluctant to issue equity 
with an additional risk premium and will opt for debt financing instead. 
 
The country specific determinant of Inflation (Inf) displays a negative coefficient with high 
degree of statistical significance (1% level) consistent with the result of Erol and Tirtiroglu 
(2011) for Turkish REITs. The result is contrary to the prediction of Frank and Goyal (2009) 
and also opposite to the findings of Le and Ooi (2012). The negative sign is consistent with the 
results of Howton et al (2003) of US REITs that suggests equity is preferred over debt when 
inflation is considered higher. A possible explanation may be that the demand for REIT equity 
may be greater than REIT debt in periods of high inflation, the holders of REIT equity are 
seeking inflation hedging investments driving a preference for equity over debt which 
managers may act on.  
 
The level of prevailing market rates (MRate) is found to have a negative sign and to be 
statistically non-significant. The sign of the coefficient is in line with trade-off and market 
timing theories, as found by Harrison et al (2010) and Cashman et al (2016). A possible 
explanation for the lack of significance is that firms in this sector are generally committed to 
long-term maturity funding, and cannot easily refinance without incurring exit costs. 
Furthermore, firms engage in hedging strategies to mitigate against fluctuations of market 
interest rates, and thus negate the detrimental effects of interest rate movements.  Thus, the 
prevailing interest rate environment seems not to significantly affect the level of leverage 
within the South African listed property sector. 
 
Not all determinants used in the models play a significant role in explaining capital structures 
within the South African listed property. Of the determinants that are significant, not one 
capital structure theory dominates the others. Instead, the statistically significant determinants 
found on this study support different capital structure theories. Notwithstanding the use of 
fixed effects regression in the full model, omitted variable bias and other unobserved 
contributing factors cannot be ruled out. Hence, the results of the regression model cannot be 
assumed to be exhaustive, and can only partially explain the capital structure question in the 








Table 5: Summary of regression results and capital structure theories 
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Chikolwa (2011); Harrison et al 












Harrison et al (2010); Morri & 
Artegiani (2015);  
Rovolis and Feidakis (2014); 





- [1% significance level] 
 
N/A (No clear connection to CS 
theories) 
 





CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Key findings 
This study provides insight into the drivers of capital structure in the South African listed 
property sector, before and after the introduction of South Africa’s REIT regime. REITs have 
unique characteristics that differentiate the capital structure debate from that of general firms.  
Having conducted panel regression analysis on firm specific, industry specific and country 
specific determinants over the period 2005 to 2019, the findings show support for certain 
determinants and the prevalence of the major capital structure theories - trade-off theory, 
pecking order theory and market timing theory – with no single theory dominating as an 
explanatory framework.  
 
Firm size, supporting the trade-off theory, and growth opportunities, supporting the pecking 
order theory, were found to be statistically significantly positively correlated with leverage 
levels.  Share performance also demonstrated a high degree of negative correlation with 
leverage levels, which supports market timing theory behavior. Share volatility (positive 
correlation) and interest cover ratios (negative correlation), provide support for further 
possible pecking order influence in leverage levels. Inflation, a country specific determinant, 
was found to have a strong negative correlation with leverage levels. The regression models, 
and possible determinants, provide a partial explanation of the drivers of South African listed 
property capital structure.  
 
The adoption of, and transition to, REIT status has seen former PUTs increase leverage from 
previously lower debt thresholds, while PLS leverage ratios remained fairly consistent. Overall, 
South African listed property after REIT implementation operated at a slightly higher level than 
before REIT status, but well below the South African REIT regulatory minimum of 60%. 
Relative to other REITs countries, South Africa exhibits lower levels of leverage versus 
jurisdictions that have debt restrictions or unlimited debt allowance. Without knowing the 
optimal debt ratio, South African REITs err on the side of debt conservatism and financial 
prudence relative to their worldwide peers, and relative to the South African REIT prescribed 
debt limit. 
5.2 Limitations of the study  
One of the main limitations of the study is the small sample size of 314 observations. Given the 
size of the South Africa listed property sector, the sample was limited. Previous similar studies 
used larger samples when either considering other major REIT markets, or combining REIT 
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markets in cross country analysis. However, some studies have been conducted with similar or 
fewer observations.55 The study may have been more informative if separate regressions could 
have been performed for each organisational type – REIT, PUT and PLS – as opposed to the 
dummy variable approach used. However, the small sample size limited this option. 
 
One of the traditionally used explanatory variables, operating risk, was not included in the 
regression analysis. Given the limited available data for the sample the metric for operating 
risk could not be calculated in accordance with previous literature or in any meaningful form 
and was thus omitted. It is possible that this may have been a significant explanatory variable 
and could have contributed to the overall fit and betterment of the model specification. In other 
literature the dividend or distribution yield (or variation thereof) was considered and shown 
to be a significant determinant of leverage.56 Missing data meant this variable could not be 
included in the model. Similarly, the roles of debt covenants, financial flexibility, managerial 
ability and debt conservatism are only addressed in possible unobserved effects of the analysis. 
It cannot be said with conviction that one or any of these factors possibly explain leverage is 
South African REITs. In summary, despite the use of fixed effects panel regression to control 
for omitted variable bias unobserved effects, there remain factors outside of the specified 
model that may have a material influence on capital structure decision making in South Africa’s 
listed property sector. 
5.3 Further research areas 
This study put forward a few questions regarding the leverage used by South African REITs as 
regulated entities in an emerging market. It has used an approach used in existing literature 
considering traditional capital structure variables with commonly used regression analysis. A 
survey of South African REIT managers like that of Graham and Harvey (2001) may be the best 
approach to truly understand the leverage decisions for REITs in South Africa. Such a survey 
may address both traditional capital structure determinants and provide insight into other 
unobservable aspects of capital structure decision making.  
 
Future studies may want to compare leverage of the South African REIT market to that of other 
South African industries or possibly dig deeper into the large differences in leverage in South 
African REITs relative to other REIT markets. Future researchers can improve on this study by 
 
55 Bond and Scott (2006) use 126 observations, Nhung et al (2017) use 204 observations, and Suciati et al (2018) use 256 
observations. 
 
56 See Harrison et al (2010) 
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addressing, in more detail, aspects such a target debt ratio, the role of covenants and financial 
flexibility, and the apparent debt conservatism of South African REITs.  
 
Another interesting area not elaborated on in this study is the relationship between leverage 
and return - specifically whether particular leverage levels lead to an optimum return to 
shareholders. Such an analysis, where return is a function of leverage, would be structurally 
different from the one performed in this study. Giacomini et al (2015), for example, investigate 
whether there are differences in returns of US REITs that are under- or over-levered relative 
to their target debt ratios or industry averages.   
 
Other than to provide a leverage range within which South African REITs operate, this study 
does not conclusively predict or propose a target debt ratio for the sample, and thus makes no 
statistical inference about target debt ratios or the reversion thereto for South African REITs. 
Studies using partial adjustment models or GMM models can possibly be used in future to 
assess target debt ratios in the South African REIT market.57  
5.4 Concluding comments 
This study contributes to the overall topic of capital structure and specifically that of listed 
property in South Africa. The findings add to the existing literature of capital structure of listed 
property and REITs, that possess unique characteristics relative to traditional firm research in 
the capital structure arena. This study will hopefully motivate further research in the area of 






57 See Versmissen and Zietz (2017), Giacomini et al (2015) 
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APPENDIX 1: Table of major developed countries with REIT status vs South Africa 
Country 
Market Cap USD 
m 
Market Cap ZAR 
m 
No. of REITS Commencement Year 
USA           1 144 066          17 160 990  200 1960 
Japan               130 710            1 960 646  66 2000 
Australia                 95 454            1 431 804  44 1985 
UK                 70 387            1 055 802  55 2007 
France                 56 111                841 665  30 2003 
Canada                 58 487                877 305  46 1994 
Singapore                 64 794                971 916  37 1999 
Netherlands                 23 665                354 981  5 1969 
Hong Kong                 37 266                558 987  9 2003 
Spain                 25 249                378 741  71 2009 





















APPENDIX 2: Table of developing countries with established REIT status 
Country Market Cap USD m Market Cap ZAR m No. of REITS Commencement Year 
South Africa           22 700         340 494  33 2013 
Thailand           14 373         215 589  60 2007 
Brazil           14 300         214 500  199 2007 
Mexico           14 150         212 256  14 2004 
Malaysia             7 022         105 336  17 2005 
Saudi Arabia             3 235           48 527  16 2006 

































USA 75% 75% Unlimited 90% 
Japan N/A 50% Unlimited 90% 
Australia N/A N/A Unlimited 100% 
UK 75% 75% ICR Test 1.25x ~ 65% 90% 
France N/A Max 20% non Real Estate Subjects to specific rules 95% 
Canada N/A N/A Unlimited 100% 
Singapore 90% 75% 45% 90% 
Netherlands N/A N/A 60% 100% 
Hong Kong N/A Max 10% non Real Estate 45% 90% 
Spain 80% 80% Unlimited 80% 
South Africa 75% N/A 60% 75% 



































Determinant Property Loan Stock (PLS) Property Unit Trust (PUT) Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) 
Description  
 
*Set up as a company where the shareholders hold linked 
units consisting of shares and debentures  
*Shareholders would receive the majority of income via 
interest on the debenture 
*Essentially a synthetic structure designed to minimise tax  
*Managed either internally by board of directors or 
externally by management company or fund manager 
 
 
*Set up as a Unit Trust where the unit holders are the 
shareholders 
*Shareholders would receive income distributions on units 
held 
*Managed externally by management company or fund 
manager 
 
* Company REIT or Unit Trust REIT with common shareholders 
*Shareholders receive income distributions on shares held 
*Managed either internally by board of directors (Company REIT) or 
externally by management company or fund manager (Trust REIT) 
*Must distribute at least 75% of its taxable earnings available for 
distribution to its investors each year 
*Must earn 75% of its income from rental or investment income from 






*Trust (Unit Trust fund structure) 
 






*Income Tax Act  
*Must abide by rules of Johannesburg Stock Exchange  
 
*Collective Investment Schemes Act (CISA) 
*Income Tax Act 
*Financial Services Board of South Africa 
*Must abide by rules of Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
 
 
*Must abide by rules of Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
*Companies Act 
*Income Tax Act  




*Can invest in direct property, property companies and 
listed companies 
 
*Can invest in direct property and property companies 
*Cannot invest in listed companies 
 




*Unlimited, prescribed in company articles of association  
 
*30% of underlying assets, prescribed by CISCA 
 




*Liable for company income tax and dividends tax (before 
April 2012 STC tax) on any residual profits after debenture 
interest  
*Interest received tax in the hands of linked unit holder 
*Liable for Capital Gains Tax on disposals  
 
 
*No tax liabilities within the Trust  
*Income distributions taxed in the hands of the unit holder 
 
*Fully tax exempt subject to maintaining REIT status 




*More flexibility with leverage and governance 
*Considered more aggressive and riskier 
*Complicated structure, excessive interest rates on 
debentures in search of tax minimisation  
*Not ideal tax treatment 




*More favourable tax treatment 
*Better regulatory governance and oversight but no 
shareholder control 
*More conservative 
*Has more resemblance to modern day REITs 
 
*Favourable and consistent tax treatment 
*Alignment of debt limits, investment universe and rules 
*Alignment of regulatory bodies  







*Disparate tax treatments between two options 
*Different leverage limits between two options, one too liberal and one too conservative 
*Different regulatory bodies for each option 
*Different management and ownership structure with implications on corporate control 
*Differences in allowable investments 
*Differences considered inequitable to one investor relative to other 





































































REIT Leverage SA vs other markets
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APPENDIX 7: Table of South African firms and firm years used in study 
Code Company Name REIT Years PLS Years PUT Years Total Years 
GRT Growthpoint          6           9          -          15  
HYP Hyprop          6           9          -          15  
FVT Fairtree          6           9          -          15  
OCT Octodec          6           9          -          15  
RES Resilient          6           9          -          15  
EMI Emira          4          -          11        15  
SAC SA Corporate          4          -          10        14  
RDF Redefine          6           9          -          15  
VKE Vukile          6           8          -          14  
HPB Hospitality          6           7          -          13  
FFA Fortress          6           3          -             9  
TEX Texton          6           2          -             8  
DIA Dipula          6           2          -             8  
IPF Investec          6           1          -             7  
REB Rebosis          6           2          -             8  
DLT Delta          5           2          -             7  
AWA Arrowhead          6           1          -             7  
GPA Gemprop          5           1          -             6  
TWR Tower          5          -            -             5  
APF Accelerate          5          -            -             5  
SAR Safari          5          -            -             5  
EQU Equites          4          -            -             4  
SSS Stor Age          4          -            -             4  
ILU Indluplace          4          -            -             4  
L2D Liberty 2 Degrees         -            -             2           2  
TPF Transcend          2          -            -             2  
SEA Spear          2          -            -             2  
SYC Sycom         -            -          11        11  
FPT Fountainhead          1          -             9        10  
CPF Capital         -            -          10        10  
ACP Acucap         -          10          -          10  
PMM Premium         -             9          -             9  
PAP Pangbourne         -             6          -             6  
APB Apex Hi         -             4          -             4  
MYT Monyetla         -             4          -             4  
AIA Ascension          3           1          -             4  
IFR Ifour         -             3          -             3  
SYA Siyathenga         -             2          -             2  
VIF Vividend         -             2          -             2  
TOTAL      137     124        53     314  
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APPENDIX 8: Correlation matrix table of explanatory variables 
 
 

















Tangibility 1                           
Growth -0.11 1                         
Size -0.35 0.15 1                       
Profitability -0.06 0.2 -0.09 1                     
PUT -0.06 0.01 0.1 -0.16 1                   
PLS 0.18 0.14 -0.07 0.46 -0.5 1                 
Lagged Leverage -0.13 -0.02 0.53 -0.11 -0.01 -0.14 1               
Interest Cover Ratio 0.22 0.08 0 0.14 -0.5 0.38 0.02 1             
Age -0.09 -0.02 -0.34 0.14 0.19 -0.1 -0.1 -0.37 1           
Property Type -0.04 -0.14 -0.19 0.01 -0.15 -0.04 0.1 -0.22 0.15 1         
Share Performance -0.04 0.38 -0.23 0.26 0 0.21 -0.03 0.07 0.32 0.03 1       
Share Volatility 0.06 -0.14 -0.28 -0.08 0.16 -0.12 -0.06 -0.02 0.09 0.14 -0.03 1     
Inflation 0 -0.11 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 0 0 0.04 0.13 0.01 -0.23 0.07 1   
Market Interest Rate -0.09 -0.21 0.26 -0.29 0 -0.26 0.13 -0.13 -0.39 0.06 -0.29 -0.18 -0.22 1 
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APPENDIX 9: Graphs of leverage ratios of selected sample firms over the study period 
 
 
 
GRT
Max: 46%
Avg: 34%
Min: 30%
HYP
Max: 29%
Avg: 20%
Min: 9%
FVT
Max: 43%
Avg: 18%
Min: 0%
OCT
Max: 38%
Avg: 33%
Min: 23%
RES
Max: 39%
Avg: 25%
Min: 16%
EMI
Max: 37%
Avg: 27%
Min: 15%
SAC
Max: 32%
Avg: 21%
Min: 7%
RDF
Max: 42%
Avg: 35%
Min: 21%
VKE
Max: 39%
Avg: 29%
Min: 22%
HPB
Max: 42%
Avg: 27%
Min: 11%
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FFA
Max: 32%
Avg: 25%
Min: 19%
TEX
Max: 50%
Avg: 36%
Min: 22%
DIA
Max: 40%
Avg: 38%
Min: 35%
DLT
Max: 47%
Avg: 42%
Min: 39%
IPF
Max: 37%
Avg: 27%
Min: 10%
REB
Max: 62%
Avg: 44%
Min: 25%
AWA
Max: 40%
Avg: 30%
Min: 22%
